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The History of Migration from Turkey to Western Europe: A Multi-theoretical Analysis of the Routes to Germany and the United Kingdom

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Abstract

Since the existing research on migration from Turkey to Western Europe does not employ multiple theoretical perspectives, this article, based on two field studies, focuses on the changing phases and forms of this human mobility by utilising a number of relevant international migration theories. The article examines the uncovered socio-economic, demographic, and political aspects of migration from Turkey to Germany and the United Kingdom and unpacks how the parameters and motives for these two routes have changed from a comparative historical perspective. In this way, it deepens the discussion on the factors and circumstances leading to migration and demonstrates that while individual, household, and historical-structural distinctions and conflicts initiate human mobility, it is perpetuated by ongoing differences, a culture of migration, networks, and ethnic economies.

Keywords: *migration history; migration theories; human mobility; labour migration; refugees*

Introduction

This article based on two field studies examines the main parameters and reasons for migration from Turkey to Western Europe[2] in the light of theoretical approaches to international migration, focusing primarily on the distinguishing characteristics of emigration to Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) from a historical perspective. The existing literature on this migration history (Abadan-Unat, 1995; Akgündüz, 1993; Icduygu, 2006; Martin, 1991; Oğuz, 2012; Sirkeci & Esipova, 2013; Sirkeci et al., 2016; Sirkeci et al., 2012) does not adopt a multi-theoretical perspective. However, like Massey et al. (1993) show, migration cannot be clarified by relying on the tools of one discipline alone, or by focusing only on a single level of analysis. In other words, theoretical approaches would be very useful in gaining a deeper insight into the motives for migration and the reasons that push people to leave the country of origin and attract the same people to move to destination countries.

This article, therefore, employs a multi-theoretical perspective to scrutinise the multiple aspects of migration from Turkey to Western Europe through field studies in Germany and the UK. To gain this perspective, it benefits from a number of relevant theoretical approaches adopting varied assumptions, concepts and frames of reference to explain the reasons behind the emergence and perpetuation of international migration. I made a decision about which theories of migration to use in a process where I have correlated the findings in my field studies, the highlights revealed by the above-mentioned literature of migration from Turkey

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[2] According to Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the total expatriate population from Turkey is over 6.5 million, 5.5 million of whom live in Western Europe (MFA, 2020).

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to Western Europe, and the assumptions of the relevant migration models: the laws of migration, neoclassical theories, push-pull models, world-system theory, dual labour market hypothesis, segmented labour market theory, the conflict model of migration, and network theory (see Arango, 2018; de Haas, 2010; King, 2012; Massey et al., 1993; Piore, 1979; Portes & Rumbaut, 2014; Sirkeci, 2009; Sirkeci & Cohen, 2016; Triandafyllidou et al., 2019; Wallerstein, 1974).

Within this framework, this paper aims first to contribute to the international migration literature by discussing the forms and phases of migration from Turkey to Western Europe from a comparative historical perspective. Second, it seeks to highlight the differences and similarities between migration from Turkey to Germany and that from Turkey to the UK; third, it aims to reveal the motives and reasons for migration between these countries from a multi-theoretical perspective. In this context, this article begins with the data and methodology used. Then, in order to provide a background for explaining human mobility from Turkey[3] to Germany and the UK, the article analyses the phases and forms of migration, namely labour migration, irregular migration, flows of refugees, and chain migration. This is a brief review of the existing literature at the same time. Finally, the distinguishing features of the migration routes to Germany and the UK are examined in the light of theoretical approaches to international migration. The discussion of return migration, however, lies beyond the scope of this paper.

Materials and Methods

This study is based on two field studies – the first conducted over a span of 12 months (ended 31 August 2015) in London, UK, and the second over 36 months (ended 31 December 2019) in the Ruhr Region (*Ruhrgebiet*), Germany. It is also based on an extensive literature review concentrated on the human mobility from Turkey to Western Europe – specifically Germany and the UK – and theoretical approaches to migration. For the first field study, I found out that most of the members of the Turkish-Cypriot, Kurdish, and Turkish community live in North London, particularly in the boroughs of Enfield, Haringey, Hackney, and Islington (London Datastore, 2015), and I therefore focused my research on that area. Sirkeci et al. (2016) report that approximately 180,000 to 250,000 Turkish-Cypriot, Kurdish, and Turkish migrants[4] live in the UK, with this total divided more or less evenly across the three groups. For the same reason, in the second field study, I concentrated my research in Duisburg, Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen, Essen and Herne in the Ruhr Region. There were 204,150 migrants from Turkey in this region in 2018 (representing 24.7% of all migrants), making them the largest migrant population in the region (Regionalstatistik Ruhr, 2020). I selected London and the Ruhr Region because they have a similar number of migrants from Turkey who, in both places, have formed concentrated ethnic enclaves and sustainable ethnic economies consisting primarily of service-sector businesses.

In these cities, I joined migrants' events and visited associations, community centres, businesses, and homes, conducting informal interviews with members of these communities to listen to and take notes on the stories of their migration and their working lives in both

[3] This article also looks into the migration of Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus to the UK because they, in addition to being an inseparable part of today's ethnic economy, were the first to move to the UK, creating networks for those coming from Turkey.

[4] I use 'migrants' as an umbrella term that encompasses immigrants, refugees (asylum seekers), (un)documented migrants, and similar individuals.

countries. For instance, on 5 October 2014, I visited the Halkevi Turkish and Kurdish Community Centre and talked to migrants from Turkey about their migration histories, among other topics. On 19 July 2017, I visited a mosque of DITIP (The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs) in Gelsenkirchen. I first spoke to the janitor and waiter of the mosque's tearoom and a visitor who are from Turkey about migration experiences to Germany. Secondly, I met the head of DITIP Gelsenkirchen to listen to his migration story and his comments about the working life of migrants in Germany. These visits and informal interviews made it easier for me to find participants for the formal interviews and enriched the results of the formal interviews. Regarding the formal interviews, I contacted the interviewees through organisations, cafes, workplaces, and community leaders, and additionally used the snowball method to recruit participants. Using semi-structured interviews, I explored in depth the demographic features, migration histories, social relationships, and working or unemployment conditions of migrants. Following preliminary research and field observations, I conducted 60 formal interviews with Kurdish, Turkish, and Turkish-Cypriot people (51 migrants and 9 descendants) in London and 40 formal interviews with Kurdish and Turkish people (31 migrants and 9 descendants) in the Ruhr Region, half of whom were women and half men.

Differences exist within these migrant groups in terms of age and generational background, so, in order to obtain more specific data during each interview, I also asked interviewees about their knowledge of the communities' migration history. While I asked my migrant interlocutors questions about their migration history, I required information from the interviewees who were born in the UK or Germany about their parents' migration history. In this way, I obtained valuable information. The interviewees mostly expressed two or more migration reasons: in the UK, in addition to family-related reasons (30%), political persecution (27%) and economic problems (25%) in Turkey and education opportunities in the UK (18%) were mentioned as migration reasons; in Germany family-related reasons (42.5%) and economic problems in Turkey (25%) were mostly stated. In both countries, around 78% of my interlocutors said that they had had relatives or friends who had supported them when they or their parents had emigrated. In both countries, the descendants told me that their parents had moved in the 1960s-1970s. While the majority of Turkish-Cypriots arrived in the UK in the 1960s-1970s, most Turks moved in the 1970s-1980s and most Kurds in the 1980s-1990s. I had interlocutors who arrived in Germany from the 1960s to the 2000s. In both countries, around 92% of my interlocutors said that they have permanent residency or citizenship in the destination countries.

A Historical Background of Migration Routes from Turkey to Germany and the UK

The dominant features of human mobility from Turkey to Western Europe have changed between the late 1950s and the 2020s and has also been affected by the enlargement of the European Union (EU) (Oğuz, 2012).[5] The principal types of this migration can be defined as international professional migration, contract-related (low-skilled) labour migration, dependant migration, asylum-seeking, and irregular labour migration from the 1960s onwards (Icduygu, 2006). This human mobility can historically be split into six phases, each with

[5] For instance, while free movement of the labour force within the EU eliminates official barriers for the citizens of new member states, labour mobility from Turkey is controlled by EU immigration policies.

distinct characteristics (Akgündüz, 1993; Abadan-Unat, 1995; Sirkeci et al., 2012): small-scale emigration through intermediaries until the 1960s; labour migration shaped by the 'guest-worker' programmes from 1961 to the mid-1970s; open-ended chain migration since the 1970s; open-ended mobility of refugees (asylum seekers) since the late 1970s; irregular (undocumented, unauthorised or clandestine) migration since the 1990s; and contemporary migration since the 2000s.

In 1957, a small group of technicians from Turkey was invited by the government of West Germany (*Bundesrepublik Deutschland*) to train in order to return to work in West Germany's factories in Turkey. However, they did not return to Turkey but found jobs in the Hamburg shipyards. After this first group, small groups were invited to West Germany via non-governmental channels to work in the docks and shipyards of Hamburg, Bremen and Kiel. This small-scale migration from Turkey to Western Europe was of skilled labour, achieved predominantly through entrepreneurs as intermediaries in Istanbul by the early 1960s. In these early years, it involved only small numbers; for instance, in 1960, approximately 2,700 workers left Turkey to work in West Germany (Abadan-Unat, 1995; Akgündüz, 1993). Following this small-scale emigration, a bilateral labour recruitment agreement signed between Turkey and West Germany in 1961 commenced so-called guest-worker programmes[6] leading to a huge wave of labour movement from Turkey to Western Europe. West Germany was the primary destination of this immigration wave. This country relied on foreign labour after the Second World War. It therefore became the destination for a steady stream of refugees, displaced people, and those expelled from Eastern Europe flowing into West Germany via Berlin.

However, this human mobility, which provided an essential workforce for the industry of West Germany, ceased with the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 (Miller, 2018). When the gates from Eastern Europe closed, West Germany sought other supplies of cheap labour and took the radical step of signing an agreement with Turkey, agreeing to a labour force from Turkey for filling the vacant jobs through the guest-worker programme (Taylor, 2008). Other factors that forced West Germany to take this step were its low birth rate and the rising resistance in West Germany to certain forms of employment (Booth, 1992). In this country, migrants from Turkey were called guest-workers (*Gastarbeiter*) because their employment was planned to be of limited duration: after two years they were expected to return to Turkey. In 1964, the recruitment agreement with West Germany was changed to allow workers from Turkey to stay for longer than two years and, later, they were allowed to bring their families (Prevezanos, 2011). In the first generation, the proportion of female workers was very low but increased over time, from under 8% in 1961 to 24.4% by 1973 (Miller, 2018). In the same period, the number of guest-workers recruited by West Germany also rose sharply from 9,000 in 1961 to 136,000 in 1973 when the programme ended (Teitelbaum & Martin, 2003). Despite a decrease between 1966 and 1968 due to the economic recession and high unemployment in West Germany, the German Liaison Office[7] in Turkey processed on average more than 50,000 workers per year between 1961 and 1973 (Miller, 2018). By 1973, some 805,000 people

[6] After its first bilateral agreement with West Germany in 1961, Turkey signed bilateral agreements with Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1964, with France in 1965, with Sweden in 1967 and again with West Germany in 1968.

[7] These offices were located at first in Istanbul and Ankara and, later, in Izmir and Zonguldak. They functioned as a foreign bureau for the German Ministry of Labour, through which German companies could meet their demand for workers. The applications were initially screened, and the candidates were pre-selected by Turkey's authorities; interviews were then organised in a Liaison Office (Miller, 2018).

from Turkey had officially moved to Germany within the guest-worker programme, and an estimated 500,000–700,000 had moved from Turkey to Western Europe without a work permit and found employment afterwards (Teitelbaum & Martin, 2003).

Official labour recruitment in all Western European countries came to a standstill in the first half of the 1970s, due to the economic recession, large-scale unemployment (Abadan-Unat, 1995), and social and cultural concerns (Miller, 2018). In 1973, the government of West Germany ended the guest-worker programme and started to introduce restrictive measures to prevent migrants from entering the country. However, the resident population from Turkey in West Germany continued to expand due to irregular migration and chain migration, principally through the arrival of the spouses and children of the workforce (Booth, 1992). This chain migration was part and parcel of the overall mobility, and those moving for family reunification would be considered as chain migrants or dependants (Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016). The volume of chain migration, particularly involving family members, rose primarily due to restrictions in other migration categories and the new child allowance policies. As a result, the number of children from Turkey living in West Germany increased by 129.8% between 1974 and 1980 (Abadan-Unat, 1995), and, whereas in the early 1970s two-thirds of foreigners in West Germany were employed, 20 years later the figure had diminished to one-third (Teitelbaum & Martin, 2003). By 1981, after the guest-worker programmes ended, an average of 80,000 people each year continued to move from Turkey to West Germany (Booth, 1992). As a result of family (re)unification, 40% of the migrant population from Turkey in West Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway were under 18 years of age in 1980 (Abadan-Unat, 1995), as also reflected in my interviewee group in the Ruhr Region, more than half of whom moved to Germany after the guest-worker era through migrant networks for the purpose of family reunification.

In 1983, West Germany – like France, the Netherlands, and the UK – introduced a 'pay-to-go programme' which offered migrants approximately DM10,000 to return to their country of origin (Black et al., 2011). However, in West Germany, only a tiny proportion of migrants (approximately 250,000 people, mostly from Turkey) were persuaded to return, due to the unfavourable economic and social circumstances in these countries (Miller, 2018). Some of my interviewees in the Ruhr Region said that their parents had returned to Turkey but had come back to West Germany within a few years as they had not found what they hoped to in Turkey.

The migration from Turkey to the UK is very different from that to Germany. The migration process of Turkish and Kurdish people living in the UK started with the migration of Turkish Cypriots whose presence in the UK can be traced back to the 1930s. A small number moved to the UK to find stable jobs and better wages in the 1930s and 1940s (Bertrand, 2004) in response to a demand for labour in the UK (Sirkeci et al., 2016). The marked increase in migration in the late 1950s was directly related to the active recruitment of labour by the UK as well as the vicious inter-communal conflict in Cyprus. The next wave occurred in the 1960s after Cyprus gained independence. A further influx resulted from Turkey's military intervention and occupation in 1974 and the partition of Cyprus that led to mass population exchanges and migration. Bertrand (2004) estimated that approximately 15,000 Turkish Cypriots left their country between 1974 and 1976. From the point of partition to today, Turkish Cypriots have continued to move to the more attractive labour markets of the UK, due to the isolation of the northern part of Cyprus, its sluggish economy, and high

unemployment rates stemming from international trade embargoes. Since 1974, 60,000 to 90,000 Turkish Cypriots have escaped Cyprus, and today their estimated population in the UK is around 80,000–120,000 (Bertrand, 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). My field research in London also found that the first arrivals in the Turkish and Kurdish community in London were from Cyprus: one pensioner who came to the UK in 1976 from Turkey stated that 'there were no Turks in the UK when we arrived, but only Cypriots around' (preliminary interview, interviewee aged around 65, male, London). The UK has never been a favoured destination for guest-workers from Turkey, and the numbers remained relatively low despite the bilateral agreement.[8] While migration from Turkey mainly flowed to West Germany, very few migrants arrived in the UK until the early 1970s (Sirkeci et al., 2016).

In Turkey, the escalation of violence and the military intervention in 1971, together with the persecution and attacks against the political opponents of the regime (including the Kurdish community, the Alevi community, socialists, labour organisations, and revolutionaries) in the 1970s sparked a politically motivated migration from Turkey to Western Europe. This gained momentum following the massacres of the Alevi community (the Maras Massacre in 1978 and the Corum Massacre in 1980) and the military coup in 1980, which led to a disregard of human rights and the torture of large numbers of Kurds and other opponents by Turkish state forces, resulting in the death or disappearance of many (Yonucu, 2021). From the early 1970s, therefore, in addition to single male workers who had acquired work permits, political opponents of the government started to move to West Germany and the UK as refugees, and then their families joined them.

The flow of refugees sharply accelerated again with the outbreak of war in Turkey, starting in the mid-1980s between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Turkish army (Kesici, 2020). After the first conflicts, systematic human rights violations continued with the imposition of a state of emergency in Bakur (northern Kurdistan in Turkey); within a framework of 'anti-PKK measures', Kurds were forcibly driven into exile from their towns and villages by Turkish governments (Dahlman, 2002; Kirişçi, 1991). The number of asylum seekers from Turkey in Western Europe, therefore, remained high during the 1980s and 1990s (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2002; Kirisci, 1991). Most of my Kurdish interviewees, in both studies, stated that they had had to move to Germany or the UK in order to seek asylum because they had suffered from ethnic discrimination and state violence in Turkey. In the 1980s, the UK became a popular destination for refugees from Turkey. While West Germany imposed visa requirements for migrants from Turkey in 1980 as part of tighter controls against them, migrants could arrive in the UK without a visa until the end of the 1980s. Members of the Alevi and Kurdish communities in Turkey arrived in the UK in the 1980s, the majority as refugees. However, like other Western European countries, the UK began to require entry visas from citizens of Turkey in 1989 as a result of the influx (King et al., 2008; Shah, 2009). The tightened immigration control measures in Western European countries and socio-economic and political instability in Turkey influenced the mechanisms of migration and paved the way for new categories of migration from Turkey to Germany and the UK, consisting of irregular migration, chain migration, and skilled labour migration in the 1990s and 2000s.

[8] The Convention on Social Insurance between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Turkey signed in 1959 and implemented in 1961; however, it was not a labour exchange or migration agreement.

Irregular migration increased dramatically and became the dominant form of migration from Turkey to Germany and the UK in the 1990s. There are many types and forms of irregularity, related to the arrival, residence, and employment of migrants from Turkey in Germany and the UK. Some irregular migrants from Turkey enter these countries without legal authorisation, some live in these countries without the required residence documents, and some work in informal sectors as clandestine workers. In addition, some use the asylum system to settle in Germany or the UK, although they are not asylum seekers. One interview, for example, highlighted several of these irregularities:

> I came to Germany to visit my brother. Then I tried to seek asylum. […] I was a political refugee until 1984; although I got married, my eldest daughter was also born. I unregistered from Dortmund. But I was not granted permission to reside in Duisburg. So, I was down without a residence permit. I had nothing, even an ID card. I worked in Germany in this way for two and a half years, and I lived illegally. (Interviewee No. 30, aged 62, male, Gelsenkirchen)

Irregularity is also a result of formal requirements and labour market dynamics in Germany and the UK, because many requirements for a residence permit and employment are impossible to fulfil for migrants from Turkey. In this context, irregularity is very useful for employers wishing to exploit migrant labour in ethnic economies and secondary sectors such as construction, the service sector, domestic work, agriculture, and the food industry, as irregular migrants provide a cheap and plentiful workforce (Triandafyllidou & Bartolini, 2020), bringing flexibility and competitiveness to the economies of Germany and the UK.

In the 2000s, another phenomenon accompanying irregular migration was chain migration. It continued with the descendants of Turkish and Kurdish migrants (citizens and non-citizens) who brought a fiancé or spouse from Turkey or the diaspora. Refugees who are allowed on settlement schemes or quotas also arrive with their family members. In many countries of Western Europe, however, dependants are not allowed to accompany temporary work-permit holders except highly qualified professionals (Kofman, 2004).

The mobility of highly qualified professionals (skilled labour migration) is another growing dimension of migration from Turkey to Germany and the UK in the 2000s. Western Europe's demand for skilled labour in the IT and welfare sectors, such as health and education, has been increasing since the 2000s and, as a result, the acceptance of permanent migration for skilled labour in the UK (primarily through the Ankara Agreement[9]) and Germany has become more prevalent (Kofman, 2004). The 2008–2009 economic crisis and the increasingly authoritarian features of Turkey's regime in the aftermath of the Gezi Uprising in 2013 are among the reasons for skilled labour to move to Germany and the UK. In the 2000s, the enlargement of the EU and refugee flows to Western Europe have also had an impact on labour mobility from Turkey. Eight Central and East European countries, Malta, and Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, after which their citizens obtained the right to move freely within the EU. In 2010, a series of anti-government uprisings started in Tunisia and spread across its neighbours, causing a huge wave of asylum seekers towards Western Europe, exacerbated by the Syrian civil war that began in 2013. Since

[9] The agreement signed in 1963 and Additional Protocol signed in 1970 established an association between the European Economic Community and Turkey. The UK became a party to the agreement with its accession to the European Community (Shah, 2009).

Germany and the UK can take advantage of the refugee workforce and the labour force provided by new EU members, labour mobility from Turkey, except for highly qualified professionals, has been further restricted due to socio-economic conditions and 'cultural differences' (Oğuz, 2012).

The volume of refugees from Turkey started to decrease in the 2000s, but this downward trend came to an end in 2015 when, after a two-year period of relative peace, the war between the PKK and the Turkish army erupted again in July 2015. One year later, on 15 July 2016, Turkey was the scene of an alleged failed coup attempt. In the aftermath of these events and the purges that followed, the number of asylum applications from Turkey increased sharply, including from a significant number of qualified professionals.[10]

A Multi-theoretical Analysis of Migration from Turkey to Germany and the UK

The theoretical approaches (at the micro, meso and macro levels) of international migration in a combination of relevant literature and field studies would shine a light on the distinguishing features of migration from Turkey to Germany and the UK. In addition to the early example of approaches – the laws of migration – functionalist models (neoclassical theories and push-pull models), historical-structural theories (world-system theory, dual labour market hypothesis and segmented labour market theory) and more recent analysis tools (network theory and the conflict model of migration) can provide a broader perspective in explaining the individual, household, and structural factors in this migration.

The Laws of Migration

The laws of migration – the first systematic theoretical approach proposed by E. G. Ravenstein (1885 and 1889), one of the pioneer scholars of migration – may reveal some characteristics of human mobility from Turkey to Germany and the UK. The desire of migrants to be economically better off and the demand for labour in centres of industry and commerce may be applicable for labour migration from Turkey to Germany and the UK. However, contrary to the claim, distance is not the most important factor in this migration, and this approach cannot show the differences between the migration phases from Turkey to Western Europe. While it is claimed that the major cause for migration is economic, many other motives remain invisible. My field studies demonstrate this, as only 25% of my interlocutors showed economic factors as their migration reasons, while almost 75% of them expressed other motivations. The assumptions that males are more likely to migrate internationally and that the major migration is from rural areas to industrial centres may be relevant for labour migration until the 1980s. However, they are no longer valid for migration in the 1990s and 2000s from Turkey to Germany and the UK.

Neoclassical Theories

One of the earliest theoretical frameworks for migration is the neoclassical migration theory, which has three principal versions: the micro view, the new economics of labour migration, and the macro view. The neoclassical approaches have been subject to various critical commentaries. On the one hand, their internal logic and elegant simplicity are recognised; on

[10] According to the UNHCR, when compared to 2013 through 2015, the number of asylum applications from Turkey filed in the UK almost doubled between 2016 and 2018. The number of applications lodged in Germany in the corresponding period represented a more than three-fold increase (Sirkeci et al., 2016; UNHCR, 2019).

the other hand, according to their critics, their ahistorical, deterministic, and functionalist framework renders them impractical and remote from the reality of human mobility (King, 2012).

Micro View of Neoclassical Theory

This theory is based on cost-benefit analysis and an assumption of rational individual decisions and sees people as atomistic and utility-maximising individuals (de Haas, 2010). According to this approach, individuals from Turkey can estimate the costs and benefits of moving to alternative international locations and move to places where they are able to maximise the return on their human capital, adjusted for the cost of migration (Portes & Rumbaut, 2014).[11] Thus, they choose to move to Germany and the UK, where the probability of employment and the expected earnings are higher (Massey et al., 1993).

Based on her interviews with migrants from Turkey in Germany, Miller (2018) argues that individual choice, ambition, and opportunity were predominant factors in the voluntary movement of migrants between the 1960s and 1980s. The suggestion that qualified workers move from capital-poor countries to capital-rich countries to reap higher returns on their skills (Triandafyllidou et al., 2019) may be true of contemporary migration in the 2000s from Turkey to Germany and the UK. However, the rational choice assumption undermines analysis in this approach and tends to disregard other migration motives, as well as the fact that migrants belong to social groups, such as households, families, and communities (de Haas, 2010). The micro view is, therefore, not so useful in demonstrating the differences between migration periods and migration forms from Turkey to Germany and the UK.

New Economics of Labour Migration

This approach, a seemingly wider decision-making framework than the micro view of neoclassical theory, suggests that the decision to move from Turkey to Germany or the UK is made by the rational household or family members together, in order to maximise family income, increase employment opportunities, and minimise risks (Massey et al., 1993). Triandafyllidou et al. (2019) concur that the decision to move is not made by isolated individuals but is often the result of a household decision, and my field studies support this. However, there is no evidence that such migrants make rational decisions to maximise family income. The theory also appears to be comparatively abstract and stylised (Hagen-Zanker, 2008).

Despite being classified as a model that sheds light on the initiation of migration by some studies (Hagen-Zanker, 2008; Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016), the new economics of labour migration may also be a useful tool in explaining the perpetuation of migration. According to my field studies, most families from Turkey do not move together but instead send one or more members of the household on ahead, leaving the door open for chain migration. The decision to return to Turkey, or to stay in Germany or the UK for family reunification, is often taken by family members together. A self-employed interviewee who arrived in Germany in 1992 cited his own experience as an example: 'We came to Germany for family reasons. My father, my brothers and our relatives were here. My mother and I came together later by family decision.' (Interviewee No. 2, aged 48, male, Duisburg).

[11] In this theory, 'international migration is conceptualised as a form of investment in human capital' (Massey et al., 1993: 434).

Macro View of Neoclassical Theory

The macro version of this theory focuses exclusively on labour-market imbalances. It proposes that migration is an equilibrium-restoring process and a way to achieve optimal allocation of production factors to the benefit of both the sending (Turkey) and receiving countries (Germany and the UK) by adopting the Heckscher-Ohlin Model (de Haas, 2010; Portes & Rumbaut, 2014). To gain a greater understanding of the initial causes of this migration, the historical balance of labour markets in Turkey, Germany, and the UK should be examined in the light of the assumptions of this approach. Although there are some differences over the period from the Second World War to the present, Turkey has always been a capital-poor country with excess labour supply, in contrast to Germany and the UK. While Turkey's economy cannot create sufficient jobs for its labour supply, Germany and the UK need a larger labour force. Thus, there is human mobility from Turkey to these countries. Moreover, the differences in wages and employment conditions between these countries offer the opportunity for workers to move from the capital-poor, labour-force-rich Turkey to the capital-rich, labour-force-poor Germany and the UK (Massey et al., 1993; Triandafyllidou et al., 2019).[12]

This movement, in an unconstrained market environment, is likely to continue until wage rates in Turkey rise to a level comparable with Germany and the UK (Portes & Rumbaut, 2014). In this way, the conditions of labour markets between these places would automatically return to equilibrium (Massey et al., 1993). However, Turkey still has a surplus of labour, due to its weak economy, while Germany and the UK have strong economies demanding skilled labour. These economic performances do not support the assumption of the macro view that migration eliminates labour-market imbalances between the country of origin and receiving country.

Push-pull Models

Push-pull models generally are counted in the neoclassical migration theories due to their rational choice assumptions (de Haas, 2021). However, they are so widely used in migration literature that they need to be addressed separately. Similarly, the push-pull factors themselves have significantly changed over time, due to migration policies, economic circumstances, demographic developments, transportation opportunities (Triandafyllidou et al., 2019), and epidemics or pandemics, such as COVID-19.

Through the lens of this approach, one would interpret human mobility from Turkey to Germany and the UK as a function of income and other opportunity gaps between these countries (de Haas, 2021). This migration is encouraged by demographic and economic inequalities, combined with revolutions in communications, transportation, and human rights. Demographic inequalities, such as differences in population growth rates and economic inequalities between these countries, thus led to migration from Turkey to Germany and the UK (Martin, 2013). High population growth rates, a surplus of labour supply, low income, weak industrialisation, and a lack of employment opportunities were among the demographic and economic push factors in Turkey until the mid-1970s. In this time frame, the main pull factors were low and stable population growth rates, more job opportunities, and mass

[12] The theory suggests that countries where the marginal productivity of workers is near zero take advantage of out-migration to those countries where the workers can be gainfully hired (Portes & Rumbaut, 2014).

production industries in West Germany. Thus, during this period, there was a significant movement of labour from Turkey to West Germany. Social and political push factors, such as armed conflicts, state violence against opponents, and a lack of security in Turkey began to accompany the economic and demographic push factors in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, the economic and social circumstances of Germany and the UK, including better living standards, greater security, safer systems, and the presence of family or community members from Turkey in these countries, continued to pull people from Turkey as chain migrants, workers, and refugees. For example, an interviewee addressed both push and pull factors in our meeting:

> I usually compared here with Turkey. We also worked in restaurants in Turkey but 16–17 hours [in a day] without insurance. We worked in those conditions until 1998. […] We had only a one-time break to eat. And labour was very cheap as well, it was something that was sold very cheaply. Here [Germany] there is a state power with the labourer, but there [Turkey] the person-labourer is very lonely. (Interviewee No. 37, aged 40, male, Essen)

Although economic factors have become more important in the 2000s, political and social push factors have also grown in Turkey since 2015. However, during this period, Germany and the UK have created obstacles rather than pull factors. They have tightened the acceptance conditions for asylum and closed the doors to unskilled labour while keeping them open for qualified professionals from Turkey.

World-system Theory

This approach, based on the 'new international division of labour', focuses primarily on structural transformation and global trends in the labour markets (Wallerstein, 1974). The theory examines colonialism and the capitalist expansion from the 'core capitalist' countries, such as Germany and the UK, to the 'periphery' and 'semi-periphery' countries, including Turkey, and demonstrates how migration occurs as a consequence of structural factors (Triandafyllidou et al., 2019).[13] Capitalist penetration into peripheral areas, through various mechanisms, dislodges rural labour, breaks traditional patterns of employment, and makes economic survival difficult. As a result, it creates potentially mobile pools of labour available for migration (King, 2012). Labour mobility and other forms of human mobility from Turkey to Germany and the UK are examples of the mechanism defined by this theory as the new international division of labour. This mechanism demonstrates that Western Europe's capitalist expansion has led to increased unemployment in Turkey by destroying traditional patterns of employment and creating labour available for migration.

> I worked for four years in Turkey. I was a grocer. I saw that the business was not working. I had too much debt. I came [to the UK] under the pretext of a relative's wedding. I started taxiing with a fake cab driver certificate. I was given a visa for six months with that paperwork. […] We took political asylum. Just as everyone did. (Preliminary interview, interviewee aged around 55, male, London)

[13] This theory classifies countries in terms of their positioning within the global market economy: Dominant capitalist powers (North America, Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) constitute the core. Poor countries in the periphery are connected to the core through asymmetrical trade ties, capital penetration, and migration. There is also a 'semi-periphery' comprised of intermediate countries, such as Turkey and Mexico (King, 2012).

The architects of Turkey's first five-year development plan (1963–1967) claimed that the export of an excess, unskilled workforce to Europe would reduce unemployment. They also assumed that the export of unqualified workers could promote the acquisition of new skills, and thus support the industrialisation of Turkey (Abadan-Unat, 1995).[14] However, contrary to the claims of government officials, studies have found a different picture. According to Aker (1974), through this programme, Turkey lost many of its most highly educated, qualified, and able citizens, who were not unemployed in Turkey. Miller and Çetin (1974) demonstrate that this programme, instead of helping Turkey's economic development, had a substantially negative impact on its economy; it incapacitated the economy and slowed Turkey's industrial development due to the high rate of labour turnover.

The world-system theory also demonstrates that the need for labour created by the economic growth in Germany and the UK attracted Turkey's cheap labour to move to these countries. This production, and reproduction, of a 'reserve army' enables Germany and the UK to call this labour up whenever it is needed to maintain a business-cycle expansion or to fill the underclass of the low-wage, low-status labour sectors (King, 2012). While in the 1960s and 1970s the international division of labour between Turkey and Western Europe was shaped by the guest-worker programmes, it has now been rearranged by new conditions – such as refugee flows, EU enlargement, irregular migration, and a demand for skilled labour in Germany and the UK in the 1990s and 2000s – affecting international division of labour over time.

Dual Labour Market Hypothesis and Segmented Labour Market Theory

The dual labour market hypothesis, based on economic duality between labour and capital, is explained in detail in Piore's prominent book, *Birds of Passage* (1979). Since developed economies, such as those of Germany and the UK, need migrant labour, international labour migration is primarily driven by pull factors. Markets are divided into primary and secondary sectors; the jobs of the primary sector are largely reserved for the existing population, while the migrants are in the secondary sector. Migration is a response to general labour shortages. It meets the need to fill the lowest positions in the social hierarchy and the requirements of the secondary sector for a dual labour market.

Since the demand for output in the economies of mass production, such as in West Germany and the UK, was stable and predictable by the mid-1970s, production could be made routine, so the production operation consisted of a series of standardised and repetitive tasks. As the skill requirements of secondary sector jobs were very limited, and the workers were not required to know more than the few tasks they actually performed, unqualified workers from Turkey and Cyprus were suitable for employment in these sectors in West Germany and the UK (Piore, 1979). Since labour migration is mainly driven by labour demand, the inequalities between primary labour markets (Germany and the UK) and the secondary labour market (Turkey) are shaped by employers, proprietors, and broader economic circumstances through selective access to occupational opportunities (Grimshaw et al., 2017).

Segmented labour market theory is a natural extension of the dual labour market hypothesis. As part of the capitalist economy, the segmentation of labour markets arises as a result of the

[14] Marxist approaches argue that economic factors and a class-based process shape immigration policy (Meyers, 2000).

economic dualism between labour and capital (Lusis & Bauder, 2010; Massey et al., 1993).[15] By the 1990s, while the labour markets of primary sectors were largely reserved for the existing population in West Germany and the UK, migrants from Turkey were only in demand from employers in the secondary sectors for low-level jobs with bad working conditions.[16] However, according to my interlocutors in both studies, the labour market circumstances in Turkey are worse than the conditions of secondary labour markets in Germany and the UK. Therefore, the labour market of Turkey can be seen as a secondary labour market in comparison to Germany and the UK.

Since the 1990s, it has been difficult for migrants to find jobs even in the secondary sectors of main economies in Germany and the UK, and they have therefore started to set up businesses in emerging ethnic economies in these countries. These ethnic economies can also be considered part of the secondary sector in terms of labour markets, because they are predominantly formed from small businesses with long working hours and strenuous working conditions, where the employees are commonly the proprietor's family members, relatives, and friends. One of my interlocutors summed up the situation in Germany as follows:

> Germans have left the construction industry, car repairing, hairdressing and all the outskirts/slum crafts. They left these to us. Germans do not do these jobs […] The state cannot train employees every month, our people deal with some of these jobs, and we do them better. (Interviewee No. 37, aged 40, male, Essen)

In the 2000s, since Germany and the UK already have regular migrants from the new EU member states, such as Poland and Romania, and also irregular migrants and refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and Turkey, employed in low-skilled secondary sector jobs, they have pulled and hired highly qualified professionals from Turkey in a form of exploitation of labour.

The Conflict Model of Migration

A recent theoretical approach to migration, this model, derived from Dahrendorf's prominent book *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (1959), is developed by Sirkeci (2009) and Sirkeci & Cohen (2016).[17] It suggests that conflicts are a primary factor causing people to move. Conflict situations, from tension to violence, are important at various levels and stages of the international migration process because they have the potential to create an environment of

[15] While the labour market is split into two main sectors – primary and secondary – in classical segmented labour market approaches (Piore, 1979; Reich, 1984; Ryan, 1981), the more current studies (Gittleman & Howell, 1995; Leontaridi, 1998; Rubery, 2007) tend to cut across the dualistic model to demonstrate the existence of multiple-segmented labour markets.

[16] According to labour market segmentation theory, certain social groups – because of their gender, race, and so forth – have limited opportunities in the labour markets and are relegated to the second division of the labour market by social, legal, and institutional forces (Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 2006). Differences in average job rewards associated with earnings, working conditions, and employment stability allow us to see those segments, although it should be noted that crisp boundaries between segments in the labour market do not exist (Leontaridi, 1998).

[17] This model suggests that the pace and type of migration are determined by the level, intensity, and source of conflict; the degrees of conflicts can be at the level of the individual (micro), household or community (meso), and state or nation (macro), while cross-level tensions are also possible; an 'environment of human insecurity' is characterised by material insecurities, such as armed conflicts and lack of employment opportunities, and non-material insecurities, such as discrimination and language barriers; the perception of insecurity forms the migration process and sometimes leads to onward migration, return migration or re-migration (Sirkeci, 2009); and international mobility is perpetuated by conflict and an environment of human insecurity, which are a part of a culture of migration (Sirkeci & Cohen, 2016).

human insecurity (Sirkeci, 2009).[18] Hence, conflicts and the environment of human insecurity have led people to move from Turkey to Western Europe. Although this approach encompasses other sources of human insecurity, such as the lack of employment opportunities and discrimination, it is an appropriate analytic tool to explain the refugee flows from Turkey to Germany and the UK. Thus, state violence, everyday racism and discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, and other opponent groups in Turkey create an environment of human insecurity for those groups and trigger a movement from Turkey to these countries. In particular, the Kurdish question and related war and conflicts in Turkey force a strong and steady flow of people to Germany and the UK (Kesici, 2020, 2021; Sirkeci & Cohen, 2016; Sirkeci et al., 2012), as one respondent illustrated:

> We fled from the Turkish state and came to this country. So, we are refugees, we find asylum in this country. We are in this country because we are Kurdish. If we had had another identity, or if we hadn't said loudly that we were Kurdish [in Turkey], maybe we wouldn't have been in this country [the UK] right now. (Interviewee No. 30, aged 38, female, London)

The movements of Turkish Cypriots to the UK can also be evaluated in the light of this approach. The sustained conflict between the Turkish-speaking and the Greek-speaking political regimes (inter-communal conflicts), the occupation and the partition of Cyprus by Turkey, and the sustained political and economic problems (Bertrand, 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003) have created an environment of human insecurity in Cyprus and led to migration to the UK, Cyprus's former colonial ruler.

The culture of migration as an aspect of the conflict model (Sirkeci & Cohen, 2016) could help to explain chain migration from Turkey. As a result of long-standing sources of conflict, such as the ethnic discrimination against the Kurds, religious discrimination against the Alevi community in Turkey (Kesici, 2021), and regional distinctions in socio-economic development levels in Turkey (Sirkeci et al., 2012), a culture of migration has developed, and this is one of the factors maintaining mobility of migrants from Turkey to Germany and the UK.

Network Theory

Network theory views international migration as an individual or household decision process. It is frequently used in the literature to explain the patterns and volume of human mobility and the perpetuation of international migration. Migrants' networks are sets of interpersonal connections that link people through shared community origins, friendship, and family ties in areas of origin and destination. When the number of migrants reaches a critical threshold, the enlargement of networks starts to reduce the costs and risks of mobility and to increase the net returns on migration, so that the probability of international movement and chain migration increases, thus further expanding the networks (Massey et al., 1993).

In the light of this theory, Sirkeci and Esipova (2013) point out Germany and the UK as parts of a migration network for people from Turkey. Palat (2014) indicates a correlation between immigration from Turkey to Germany and the accumulation of Kurds and Turks in Germany.

[18] Conflicts seen between individuals, communities, states and other agents in human movements are defined in a broad range from full cooperation, where conflict does not exist, to violent conflicts where one can face life-threatening risks (Sirkeci & Cohen, 2016).

My field studies also demonstrate that the networks of migrants from Turkey in both Germany and the UK are very strong due to their social, economic, and political ties. Most of my interviewees have family members, relatives, or friends who helped or supported them to move and settle in Germany or the UK.[19] A qualified professional in the UK cited her own experience as an example:

> There was a friend of mine here at the Faculty of Economics. I had been enrolled in the school by her. She had created an environment. I also settled in the hostel where she lived. By relying upon her I came […] Then I found a job immediately in a month or two. (Interviewee No. 8, aged 36, female, London)

The migration history of these migrants may reveal how these networks have worked overtime: the volume of migrant population had already reached a critical threshold in the period before the ethnic economies began to occur in the 1970s (in West Germany) and 1980s (in the UK), and their networks started to open a way for newcomers. While migrants who initiated the chain migration through networks in the UK were Turkish Cypriots who were the earliest arrivals, in West Germany they were Kurdish and Turkish migrants from Turkey. Since then, they have given economic support, facilitated employment and accommodation, and, in addition to information, provided assistance in several forms to potential migrants and new arrivals (Arango, 2018) in the construction industry, service sector, and textile and garment industries of Germany and the UK. A self-employed interviewee presented his own experience as follows:

> We came here because 80 per cent of our family, who had come here during the [guest]worker period, was living here. I worked in factories for a short time. Now I have my own tourism business. Tourism is our family profession. My brother has been doing this since the [guest]workers era. Now he is retiring and we continue the same thing. (Interviewee No. 7, aged 35, male, Duisburg)

With the establishment of ethnic economies in Germany and the UK, newcomers started to be employed through these networks. The migrants, alongside employment, provide assistance in various forms, including financial support, accommodation, and even setting up a new business in the ethnic economy for new arrivals.

Conclusion

This article, based on two field studies, benefits from international migration theories, including functionalist and historical-structural hypotheses, and from the existing literature on migration from Turkey to Western Europe to shed light on the distinguishing features of migration from Turkey to Germany and the UK. The article attempts to contribute to the international migration literature by delving into human mobility from Turkey to Western Europe from a comparative historical perspective. It shows how migration from Turkey to Germany and the UK is shaped by the historical-structural and individual factors, multiple intertwined motives, the economic dynamics in different countries, and the international division of labour.

[19] These networks therefore have an effect on migrants' potential migration destinations in the sense that they are seen as sources of information about the target places (Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016).

The findings of the article demonstrate that, although historically various and complex factors have prevailed in different periods, at most times individual preferences, household decisions, structural distinctions, and conflicts initiate migration from Turkey to Germany and the UK. While economic, social, and demographic factors were prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s, later, political circumstances in Turkey started to add to these factors encouraging this human movement. The individual and historical-structural factors that perpetuate migration from Turkey to both countries are ongoing differences, a culture of migration, the networks of migrants, family and kinship ties, and their ethnic economies in Germany and the UK. Throughout the history of this migration, in addition to conflicts, the differences in population growth rates, proportions of young population, living standards, democratic standards, safety and security levels, the possibility of discrimination, employment opportunities, wages, and incomes between these countries continue to be reasons for migration. While it is more plausible to generalise these historical-structural factors, in many cases this is not viable for the individual factors, because the combination of motives that leads to migration generally varies from one person or family to another and the individual motives comprise a mixed combination of push-pull reasons and keeping-restraining factors. When the push-pull factors become more dominant than the keeping-restraining factors, conditions favour migration.

Further, despite some apparent similarities, the human mobility from Turkey to the UK differs from that to Germany. Turkish Cypriots who started to move to the UK in the 1930s opened a way for newcomers from Turkey in the 1970s, just as the first-generation guest-workers did in West Germany. While Turkish Cypriots moved to the UK to respond to a demand for labour, in the 1960s and 1970s the labour migration to West Germany was mainly shaped by the guest-worker programmes. Then, the open-ended chain migration and refugee flows came, along with the labour migration. Migration from Turkey to the UK started in the 1970s, principally in the form of refugee flows, and then developed in a similar way to that in Germany. Today migrants who have sought asylum form a higher proportion of total migrants from Turkey in the UK than in Germany, although the number of migrants from Turkey in Germany is ten times more than in the UK. In the 1990s, irregular migration started to be the main form of immigration to both countries, which offered opportunities for employers to exploit migrant labour and enabled the national economies of Germany and the UK to be more flexible and competitive. In the 2000s, as a reflection of the new international division of labour between Turkey and Western Europe, contemporary migration with skilled labour has become prevalent. Since Germany and the UK can draw on irregular migrants, refugees, and citizens of new EU member states to fill the least desirable jobs in the secondary sector, they now pull and hire a qualified workforce from Turkey.

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