

Changing Numbers, Living Conditions, Unchanging Biopolitical Problematic: Syrian Refugees in Turkey

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Abstract

Five years ago, the study titled “Biopolitical Problematic: Syrians Refugees in Turkey” was the second chapter of the book, “Turkey’s Syrians, Today and Tomorrow” published. Its argument was found remarkable and got good feedback. This study aims to update the recent statistics belonging to the Syrian refugees and revise the new developments in connection with the discussed biopolitical perspectives. It is obvious that with its nationalist character, Turkey continues to give its citizens some moral and respectable codes to save and to defend, which also defines civil types of human behaviour and relations, which are all the time culturally and politically approved but put a kind of fear inside people. Therefore, nothing has changed on the theoretical ground, but the reader can find new references problematizing the integration issue. Syrians’ noticeable presence in almost every region and mostly negative narratives of the locals, their integration strategies, and the government’s policies have been supported by recent literature and, recently most of the reaction appears because of the thought that “they are not actually guests.” However, rising of such a belief is not enough to change the theoretical framework constructed for the previous study: Agamben’s concepts of the camp, bare life, and state of exception, Foucault’s opinions on the relationship between security, territory, and population as associated with the socio-political practices, and Furedi’s culture of fear is still the key concepts of the theoretical process.

Keywords: *Biopolitics; Syrians, international migration; Turkey*

Introduction

Nothing has changed about the past: In Turkey, based on Geneva Convention in 1951 and Geneva Protocol in 1967², only those who come from European countries can be accepted as “refugees” by the government due to a geographical limitation. However, because of the increase in number of refugees in 1990s, a 1994 regulation revised the national law which was adopted in 1961³ (Erdogan, 2015, p. 46). As for Syrian refugees, before delving into a theoretical discussion, and the need to summarize the background of their influx into Turkey, it should be noted that this has been occurring since April 2011. This influx can be attributed to the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad and the expansion of the civil war to the large parts of Syria. However, as a country embracing the casual relationship between authority and

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² Officially the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, also known as the UN Convention on Refugees and often referred to as the Geneva Convention, it covers the asylum-seekers and refugees who have experienced the events happening before 1951, 1961 Geneva Protocol is a revision of Geneva Convention, abolishing date-limitation, however, it brings out geographical limitation.

³ Date of Law: 29/08/1961 – Act: 359.



“one-dimensional man” (Meyer-Emerick, 2004,p.1), Turkey seems to have developed and applied a more humanitarian approach to the Syrians compared to European countries, the United States, and Australia. These countries place Syrians in detention centers that are governed by tough laws, which even ignore the immigrants’ political and social rights (Tyler, 2006; Ahmed, 2004). Turkish government firstly recognized the Syrian National Council⁴ as a political power in Syria, and then the “open-door” policy is put into effect. “Temporary Protection Regulation” ensuring non-refoulement came to be the second official policy (Kirişçi, 2014).

Nevertheless, about “Temporary Protection Regulation” of today, some written sources claim that the applications are so flexible that Syrian men can return to their country whenever they want (especially young men for fighting), however, for some, if they do return to their country they can never come back again⁵ (Yıldız, 2013). Such contradictory circumstances and the agreements mentioned above make the use of “refugee” concept complicated for the newcomers. Moreover, such “flexible” policy does not seem appropriate for principles of emergency protection, human rights protection and non-refoulement; contrary to the condition of “a refugee never becomes an active side of the war in his/her very own country” (Yıldız, 2013; Çiçekli, 2009).

Numbers and life conditions have changed: Under antinomies, total number of Syrian refugees in Turkey in 2017 exceeded 3 million (Yucesahin and Sirkeci, 2017). The Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (DEMA) announced in June of 2016 that a total of about 260,053 Syrian refugees live in the housing centers categorized as tent cities and container cities.⁶ According to the Directorate General of Migration Management there are 258,597 Syrians⁷ were living in 26 housing centers. On the other hand, there is a population growing really fast and living outside of these camps which are estimated to be over 2,5 million.

The Turkey Demographic and Health Survey-2018 held by Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies had a Syrian sample for the first time in its history, providing quite reliable data to social scientists. Table.1 basically demonstrates that Syrian households have young population reflecting children and economically active ages and almost half of them still live in the camps. On the other hand, the report points out that “overall, currently married Syrian women aged 15-49 have had an average of 3.2 children compared with 2.7 children among all women, regardless of current marital status. On average, by the end of their reproductive years (age 45-49), Syrian migrant women in Turkey have given birth to 6.0 children with 5.5 surviving” (HUIPS, 2019: 41). The report puts forward that total fertility rate (TFR) is 5.3. The proportion of Syrian women who want to stop childbearing are generally the ones who are well-educated. Therefore, “52 percent of currently married Syrian women having no

⁴ According to the Middle East Security Report 4, Syria’s Political Opposition, 2012, by Elisabeth O’Bagy, the Syrian National Council (SNC) is the widely known political opposition coalition which is made up of seven different blocs: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Damascus Declaration, the National Bloc, the Local Coordination Committee (as representatives of the grassroots movement), the Kurdish Bloc, the Assyrian Bloc, and Independents. Its center is in Istanbul, however, it cannot encourage the local forces as it used to be at the beginning of the conflict because of the increasing influence of the military force. See, Middle East Security Report 4, Syria’s Political Opposition, 2012, by Elisabeth O’Bagy. pages 10-36.

⁵ Some conversations with the Syrian refugees in Istanbul, Gaziantep and Hatay point out such arrivals and departures. However, none of them are official. The Geneva Convention includes basic standards for the refugee travels. See <http://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html>, <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10>.

⁶ <https://www.afad.gov.tr/TR/IcerikDetay1.aspx?IcerikID=848&ID=16>. Last update: 30.10.2017. Visited:18.02.2017.

⁷ Sirkeci (2017):136.



education or incomplete primary want to stop childbearing, compared with 33% of those who have high school or higher education” (HUIPS, 2019: 52).

Table. 1. Percent Distribution of the De Facto Household Population by Age Groups, According to Sex and Residence Turkey, DHS, 2018.

Age	Non- camp			Camp			Total		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
<5	18.6	17.4	18.0	19.0	16.5	17.7	18.6	17.4	18.0
5-9	13.2	13.9	13.5	19.1	16.9	18.0	13.4	14.0	13.7
10-14	12.6	13.6	13.1	13.9	16.0	15.0	12.7	13.7	13.2
15-19	10.6	9.9	10.2	9.3	7.3	8.3	10.5	9.8	10.2
20-24	10.7	10.1	10.4	4.1	7.0	5.6	10.4	9.9	10.2
25-29	8.4	8.6	8.5	5.4	6.9	6.1	8.2	8.5	8.4
30-34	7.6	6.5	7.1	5.5	6.4	6.0	7.5	6.5	7.1
35-39	5.3	4.9	5.1	6.5	6.2	6.4	5.3	5.0	5.1
40-44	3.6	3.9	3.8	5.4	4.3	4.8	3.7	4.0	3.8
45-49	2.7	2.5	2.6	3.9	2.4	3.2	2.7	2.5	2.6
50-54	2.4	2.9	2.6	2.4	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.9	2.6
55-59	1.3	2.0	1.6	1.6	2.9	2.2	1.3	2.0	1.7
60-64	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.9	1.2	1.1	1.5	1.5	1.5
65-69	0.7	1.1	0.9	1.6	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.1	0.9
70-74	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.5
75-79	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.2
80 +	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.3
Don't know/missing	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Dependency age groups									
0-14	44.4	44.9	44.6	52.0	49.4	50.7	44.7	45.1	44.9
15-64	53.9	52.9	53.4	45.0	47.4	46.2	53.5	52.6	53.1
65+	1.7	2.2	1.9	3.0	3.0	3.0	1.7	2.3	2.0
Don't know/missing	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Child and adult populations									
0-17	50.7	49.8	50.3	57.7	54.3	55.9	51.0	50.0	50.5
18+	49.3	50.2	49.7	42.3	45.6	44.0	49.0	50.0	49.4
Don't know/missing	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Adolescents 10-19	23.2	23.5	23.3	23.2	23.3	23.3	23.2	23.5	23.3
Number of persons	5,428	4,995	10,423	233	241	473	5,661	5,236	10,897

Source: The TDHS-2018 Report, HUIPS, 2019. Ankara. p. 17

On 20th October 2022, the number of Syrians under temporary protection is 3,622,486. This number is 29,648 persons less than it is in September. From the beginning of 2022, the registered Syrian population dropped by 114,883 persons. Thus, it can be thought that this intense cross-border population movement from Syria referring to mass migration and having spread to various geographic regions of Turkey has tended to “back home”. On the other hand, the number of Syrians temporarily sheltered is 47,782, which was 58,757 at beginning of 2021. Today, only 1,3 percent of them live in the camps; about 99 percent live in the cities like İstanbul, Ankara, Antalya, Aydın, Kocaeli, Bursa, Çanakkale, Edirne, Hatay, Gaziantep,

Muğla, Sakarya, Tekirdağ.⁸ In those cities, as an aside, there are nearly 1170 neighbourhoods that are totally closed to the foreign people, even ones coming from the United States of America and European countries⁹.

Apparently, the number of tent and container cities has dropped but left their places to the various neighbourhoods, the political time made them more localized. However, in these places which recognizably refer to organized camp life and, that life and the influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey as a mass of “foreign” identities, their political positions, expectations, and humanitarian reception keep providing social scientists -mainly in Turkey- with a methodologically attractive field. And therefore, one can find numerous articles and reports - all recent and based on field research- in the literature. Most of the studies focus on governmental approaches to the refugees and (mostly negative) attitudes of the locals to the new-comers (Yazgan et al., 2015, p.186). Besides, discussions and publications on human rights, freedoms, and legal practices are still everywhere and research reports continue to product new paths for discussion as well as playing a key role in generating data, re-thinking, and producing the theoretical background.

Nothing has changed with the main argument and theoretical view: With its nationalist character, Turkey grants its *citizens* some moral and respectable codes to save and to defend, which also defines *civil* types of human behaviour and relations, which are all the time culturally and politically approved but put a kind of *fear* inside people. That is why while the first part of this study presents a description of the position of the refugee as viewed by the political power that s/he is forcibly confronted with, the reminder of the chapter problematizes the integration issue in terms of consequences of the Syrians’ inland movements in Turkey; their noticeable presence in almost every region and the *fear* of the locals. Agamben’s concepts of *the camp*¹⁰, *bare life*, and *state of exception*, and Foucault’s opinions on the relationship between *security*, *territory* and *population* as associated to the socio-political practices, and Furedi’s *culture of fear* are the key concepts of the theoretical process.

Revision of Biopolitical Setting and Presence of Refugee Subject

This part points out the bases of theoretical construction, the approaches discussed before continuing to be remarkable today as well as they are in 2017: For a firmer theoretical and political understanding, one needs to grasp the relationality between population and politics. Biopolitics deals with population, which is beyond any doubt a political problematique as well as a demographic concept. Population dynamics (birth, death, migration) (no “etc.,” population has only three dynamics) are historically subject to supervision of the state and the discourses in order to perpetuate the political existence, which is driven by ambition of power and growth (just a simple introduction to the following argument). When the intellectual development of individuals, along with wars, epidemics, and death (factors affecting those individuals) are constantly controlled in a social structure conforming to the expectations and targets of an administration, the power emerges. This way, political economy starts

⁸ Association of Refugees/Mülteciler Derneği: <https://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi/> Visited: 30.11.2022.

⁹ http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/syrian-nationals-benefiting-from-temporary-protection-in-turkey_917_1064_4773_icerik. (Sirkeci, 2017:136)

¹⁰ Also Tuncer-Gürkaş (2014) analyzes the region surrounding the border between Syria and southeastern Turkey based on Agamben's concept of "camp", that is the realm of existence for spatial and social polarization. Elaborating on "state of exception" in southeastern Turkey, she defines "camp" as a representation of a life marked by the binary oppositions of citizenship-foreignness, national identity and otherness, belonging-unbelonging, inclusion and exclusion. They are governed by security discourses, and the sovereign envisages them as spaces of crisis and tension.



functioning as biopolitics; moreover, the population becomes the biopolitics of power (Foucault, 2010; Wallerstein, 2013; Oksala, 2013).

In a study, Ruth Judge (2010, p.6)¹¹ asks “how power-knowledge relations in contemporary Britain produce the refugee subject...What behaviours are expected of them?” These questions refer to where the acts of power are positioned as a methodological attitude fully encircling the society, turning it into a representation of itself. Therefore, population equals to biopolitics, and according to Foucault, it refers to a dynamic, representational mass identified by administration strategies rather than describing a mass of ruled people.

The main objective of biopolitics is to categorize and re-evaluate population by communities and such an act should be understood as a kind of commodification: Murtola talks about “a social reality in which attempts are made to turn most any form of human experience into a commodity or a means of capital accumulation” (2014, p.836) and correlates this reality with commodification. Sharp mentions that commodification refers to objectification which transforms human bodies into objects of economic desire (2000, p.293). With reference to these approaches, a political desire of formalization can straightforwardly be found out; the population is something that power can re-organize, administer, and manipulate. The population also produces the power's knowledge and the area of supervision (Foucault, 2013). For instance, rather than being treated as a “citizen”, an individual within such a population is categorized at once; s/he is given a special form and position to re-produce in a political economy defined by the art of liberal administration; s/he protects both her/his own and the power's authority; and s/he aims to merge, be active, and progress with that power. Then, as opposed to the “citizen” whose national identity and belonging are -externally- defined by borders, what is the status of the refugee who crosses borders? How should one define the “subjectness” dilemma and the political position of the refugee?

While passing through the border is the only way for a refugee to win an ontological struggle, the local resident considers “allowing transit” almost as “breaking tradition”, a matter of “codes” and “fear”. The irony here is between a granted transit and a discourse defining the fiction of a second subject: The fiction of a subject desired by the power emerges right through the discursive exercises re-constructing subjects. As the power fully violates the privacy of its subjects and thus, is responsible for the protectionist-conservative or liberal-humanist stance with regard to the “other” via its “subjectification” strategies, one needs to deal with it politically and discursively.

Above all, the refugee-subject is in a void, a victim to political targets and conditions: Politically and socially isolated, s/he dwells on a threshold. Within the state-individual relationship as Badiou defined and Agamben re-argued, “singularity and excrescence” are unrepresented in the society they belong to, but do not belong to the whole in which they are represented (Badiou, 2007).¹² The refugee is in most cases still a “citizen”, but devoid of the territory (homeland) in which her/his belonging is represented; s/he is a member of a camp¹³

¹¹ Refugee advocacy and the biopolitics of asylum in Britain. The precarious position of young male asylum seekers and refugees. Paper submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Forced Migration at the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, May 2010. Working Paper Series 60. Refugee Studies Centre Oxford Department of International Development University of Oxford. p. 6.

¹² According to Badiou, *singular multiples of a situation are presented in it, but are not represented. They belong to the situation but, are not included. Normal multiples are both represented and included. To change a situation radically the aim is to have what belongs to it (singularity) included in it* (cited by Lechte, 2008: 237)

¹³ or tent or container city as in Turkey.

where s/he resides now, taking refuge under a new sovereign's rule and authority. Economically in a void, s/he is also devoid of certain kinship due to war and migration. If we refer to Turner's concepts of *liminality* and *communitas*, the refugee is a *liminal subject*; one who can envisage a "life in-between" and talk about a *transformative experience* (Turner, 2002). Her/his social role is ambiguous, identity formation is disrupted, and personal relations are uncertain and unstable. The refugee is in a situation where one cannot look back to those left behind, and the new has not fully emerged yet; living on a threshold where one has almost completely detached herself/himself from the past, and the future has yet nothing to promise. For threshold dwellers, new opportunities and available spaces are all temporary. They represent an unstructured and unhierarchised history, and experiential collectivism (Turner, 2009). What is called the "transition" period, however, seems as a great unknown to the refugee due to future uncertainties. Therefore, the refugee's existence is surrounded by contradictions, her/his subject position is politically and socially constructed beforehand, s/he has lost her own political characteristics, and has been isolated by all external factors - good or bad- highlighting her/his foreignness. The designation "refugee" suffices alone to isolate her/him in the socio-political field. Moreover, as a member of a subpopulation, the refugee poses a "problem" to the upper-population.

Approaching masses of refugees as a wide area for further problematization, one can consider -from a sheer political perspective- accepting a very high number of refugees and facilitating proper and rapid integration processes as good steps for a government to achieve a firmer position in its foreign policy in terms of human rights and humanitarian aid. For instance, this can for sure help Turkey's accession process to the EU. Success of an integration policy, however, cannot be directly related to the number of new refugees but reasons and conditions under which one migrates, and efforts to protect refugees' rights and freedoms are just as important (Arango, 2006). Based on Agamben's understanding of biopolitics, the key step of integration is to bring populations closer by abolishing spatial differences between different lives, gradually make them participate in the political life, and ensure the functioning and stability of control mechanisms (Baştürk, 2006). Especially, war refugees are in a long term escape; their exposures to integration processes depend on the duration of their intended stay in a new country. The power's systemic agenda, biopolitics, will thus orient, transform, and coordinate them under the subordinating and controlling mechanisms just as much as the pre-configured local subjects. Surrounded by new political-discursive practices, the refugees face another *governmentality*, subject formation, and controlling mechanism. Following a change in their bonds, if we borrow Butler's concepts (2005), each of the refugee subjects is on a threshold towards a new existence; and this existence is very much related to her/his will to live and desire to survive. Trying to adapt to a previously non-existent relationality within a new network of bonds (due to personal concerns alone), each contributes to local subjects' actions re-producing the power.

Resident of the "State of Exception": Subjectification of "Homo Sacre"

Agamben suggests that the most fundamental reality for humans is their various rights and freedoms. They should acquire the status of a norm without exception. A human as a form is the totality of unchanging principles. S/he is temporally and spatially transcendental with her/his natural rights; and s/he is a political being through the consensus that her/his rights and freedoms are permanent, and they are fully acknowledged. Articulation of their rights and



freedoms on a discursive plane is the very source of their political positions (Agamben, 1998, p.76-77).

On the other hand, “if refugees (whose number continuously grow and who represent a considerable segment of humanity today) represent such a disquieting element in the order of the modern nation-state, this is above all because by breaking the continuity between man and citizen, nativity and nationality, they put the original fiction of modern sovereignty in crisis. Bringing to light the difference between birth and nation, the refugee causes the secret presupposition of the political domain -bare life- to appear for an instant within that domain. The refugee is truly the man of rights, the first and only real appearance of rights outside the fiction of the citizen that always covers them over. Defining refugees politically is difficult for this exact reason” (2013, p.158).

Quite normally, the natural transcendence and victimization of the person who is loaded with great rights and freedoms, and named *homo sacer* by Agamben, turn “subjectification” into a key problem for the sovereign. The subjectification level of the “foreign” therefore, stands as an intriguing question, and requires a different strategy.

Foucault (2010) states that free market creates standard forms of life that comply with the organization of life it offers. This is the point where the life of the refugee, as a “foreign subject”, is on the verge of acquiring a new meaning. Together with the concept of micro-history as in Foucault's *The Birth of Biopolitics*, historical experiences of a refugee help one better analyze her/his position within a community and relations of power. On a macro level, the refugee is in a discourse construction site which is designated and defined by multiple and random relations from the perspective of political economy; s/he is subjected to various strategies and thus transformed; and finally s/he is allowed entry into a new community based on the forms that comply with relationalities and available discourses. As projected by the political economy, the refugee is allowed entry into pre-defined forms of relations, organizations, and categorizations.

Besides all possible forms of reception, Foucault also warns that the more the power focuses its own national existence, the more it raises *others'* risk of dying by creating the conditions required (Foucault, 2010; Rabinow & Rose, 2006). This is actually what Negri and Agamben indicate, too: Contemporary bio-power points the power which eventually targets exploitation of or the death of others (Agamben, 2000a, 2000b; as cited in Rabinow & Rose, 2006)¹⁴. Moreover, Agamben enunciates that doctors, lawyers, advocates, philosophers, even families are the representatives of power and they decide who must survive or who must not, on behalf of sovereign authorities (as cited in Hall, 2007, p.36). Today as European societies are investing in health care, we witness at the same time how they are creating tougher laws and financial obligations against refugees. Moreover, thousands of Syrians have been left to die in a very immoral way.¹⁵

As for what happens in Turkey in 2022-year, national media, social media and local written sources show that Syrians have become the majority of Turkey's population of about four million refugees in Turkey. Moreover, according to both official numbers and special works

¹⁴ “biopower takes the form of a politics that is fundamentally dependent on the domination, exploitation, expropriation and, in some cases, elimination of the vital existence of some” (Rabinow & Rose, 2006, p.198)

¹⁵ The UNHCR reports that the number of Syrians drowned at the sea, symbolized by baby Aylan Kurdi, is 3.740. <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/10/580f3e684/mediterranean-death-toll-soars-2016-deadliest-year.html>.

of intellectuals in Turkey like academics, and well-known journalists, Turkey “hosts” the largest refugee population in the world, whose number also comprises Afghans, Iranians, and Iraqis.¹⁶

Turkey’s humanitarian manner, establishing “cities” to take shelter in, or recently, letting them find new neighborhoods to live in, is notable. However, remembering some scientific results acquired from the *camps* will be helpful for supporting any discussion on the refugees’ troubles: In a research measuring overall satisfaction in camps, more than half of the asylum-seekers (67%) seem to be satisfied with their lives. Syrian refugees living in “tent cities”, where the electronic cards that are used in “container cities” do not exist, however, would like to start using electronic cards as they will help them better manage their *culturally accepted* expenditure, especially food expenditure (Yıldız, 2013, p.155). Other demands and comments include the lack of a female doctor (as being examined by a male doctor is *not religiously acceptable*), *Arabic-speaking* teachers and *Arabic books*, not having a TV, thus being unaware of the current situation in their country, the need for improved social conditions and humanitarian treatment in camps, being offered psychological and pedagogical assistance for children to fight war-related traumas, and the desire for long-term stay in Turkey (Yıldız, 2013, p.158-63). All these demands actually might seem natural expectations for an individual who is granted the status of a refugee and, natural rights and their non-transferability in modern politics, regardless of their status, are sacred; and ideally, they should be considered independent from politics and defined without being manipulated by politics.

However, in Agamben's imagination of *camps*, people are neither inside, nor outside of the law. Refugee camps are fields of much debate based on Agamben's camp theorem; surrounded with precautions in a state of exception, camps become ordinary and permanent. Residents of camps are always known as non-citizens, alienated from socio-political life, reduced to their membership in bare life (Arendt, 1998). To expect being detached from politics, however, contradicts with the fact that (along with the political and legal definition of the concept of a refugee itself) it is the political power which is responsible for the protection of the rights and freedoms. But this is more than a contradiction; it is the place where space, time, and law of the political order are abolished, and *bare life* appears (Agamben, 2013). The refugee is there with her/his biological characteristics, rather than her/his socio-political identity; in this place where the law of the political order does not promise complete security, s/he is under the absolute judgment of the sovereign. As natural rights vary and multiply, the projection and protection levels of the power naturally increase. This is the source of that very much needed judgment: this relationship does nothing but re-produce the power and its knowledge, strengthening it even more.¹⁷ Moving from camps to districts or neighbourhoods has not helpful for getting rid of a bare life. “Supervision-state” and its pedagogically formed -so, very effective- original citizens will continue to stay on alert for the sake of national borders which metaphorically reflected from almost everything around like flag, language, even coasts (Civelek & Gül, 2023). For instance, in 2018, around 31,426 Syrians were living in Sultangazi district located on the European side of Istanbul and in 2020, Syrian

¹⁶ Kelly Pettillo, the program coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Program, “Turkey’s open door closes: how Europe can better support Syrian Refugees” <https://ecfr.eu/article/turkeys-open-door-closes-how-europe-can-better-support-syrian-refugees/> Visited: 02.12.2022.

¹⁷ Individualism means blessing the biological existence of the human and its uttermost prioritization. The power, however, constructs individualism on a discursive level. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is evidently a fiction of the power aiming subordination through designation; it does nothing but highlights the power's legal and administrative sovereignty.



population reached 60,000. Such an increase might be evaluated as part of a pattern of refugee integration and/or assimilation but increasing anxiety and impatience among the locals¹⁸ should be considered.

The previous study had already pointed out that although many refugees intend to “return to their countries” (Yıldız, 2013, p.160), they have already been designated and categorized by the power in Turkey; therefore, the process of subjectification has already started for each and every refugee. Based on Foucault’s approach¹⁹ the phases of such subjectification are a) direct targeting, b) penetrating into all segments of daily life instead of being a structure determining only the limits of a person's political activities, c) manipulating perceptions and interpretations, d) affecting the psychology and decision making processes, and e) proper framing of the whole subjectification. While the presence of “electronic cards” within camps represents an “interpellation”, that refugees associate this regulation as “seeing needs in a culturally accepted method” can be the very first political step into the creation of exception. Although the refugee seems to have acquired a space for freedom, in reality s/he is moved into an area of representation by the sovereign through the use of an “electronic card”. Is s/he now inside or outside? According to Agamben, modern power functions exactly by designating humans - which is striking. Humans are designated and discursively transformed; this transformation strategy is a representational element of biopolitics (Agamben, 1998, p.72-73). In such a case, they are neither inside nor outside; “the card” describes them, differentiates them and excludes them while it gets them included. When it comes to living in the districts like Sultangazi -may be, still there are ones having those cards- the relationship between subjectification and transformation can not be evaluated as “nothing will be the same as it is in the past”. Because when the sustainability of exclusionary effect of the variables related with a sense of belonging, place attachment, some secular emotions, main values of Turkish culture, Turkish language are taken into account (Tınar, 2021), it will be noticeable that, for Syrians, changing and expanding space or location does not mean any kind of liberalization area, it is just referring to the different representations of the sovereign and means of the transformation.

Bauman and Lyon (2013) suggest that societies tend to be tense. Actual events are full of contradictions, risks, adventures, freedoms, strategies, repetitions, copies, imitations and all, refer to the needs. Even the tools of satisfying one or two of these can cause new contradictions. On the platform on international migration, the biopolitical process of governments permanently meet with a struggle against the “foreigners” who are uncontrollable “disorganizers”, giving locals the shakes (Bauman, 2016:14). That is why migrant is always the one who constantly pauses. In such a case, border crossing makes “knowing the spaces of supervision well” and “learning the desirable behaviours” vital and push the migrant to think about tactics and strategies.

¹⁸ As underlined by Crisis Group’s report, *Turkey’s Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions, the risk of violent clashes between hosts and refugees is higher in places where the stress on public services overlaps with labour market competition and identity-related demographic concerns. Sultangazi is such a place.* For more, see the article titled “Integrating Syrians Refugees in Istanbul’s District of Victimhood” provided by <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/integrating-syrian-refugees-istanbuls-district-victimhood>, visited: 03.12.2022.

¹⁹ See “Revisiting Foucault through reading Agamben: Implications for workplace subjectification, desubjectification and the dark side of organizations” by Richard Ek, Martin Fougère and Per Skälén. The study elaborates processes of subjectification and desubjectification in two different philosophers’ eyes. For the definition of process of subjectification p. 2-4

Explanation of the Experience of “State of Exception”

In Agamben’s literature on sovereign power in the state of exception is naturally totalitarian and “not only does it hold complete sway over the individual, but, in contemporary societies, the state of exception is permanent, rather than temporary” (Ellermann, 2009, p.4). Thus, according to him, politics and life are variables of a formula; humans experience political life and *bare life* (Agamben, 1998). There are major differences in these two main fields: while living in a community and being an individual are vital in the political life, bare life defines a life outside of politics and laws. The exclusion in bare life determines the borders of city / social life / politics; it still contributes to their construction by being excluded. Exclusion, in other words being pushed outside of the social life, is the first political activity; and bare life is omnipresent in this activity. The key feature of modern politics is the vagueness of the line surrounding the political field and accommodating the bare life, while mechanisms condemning people to uncertainty between their socio-political life and biological existence.

In a way, bare life and political life show a certain resemblance.²⁰ Sovereignty is constructed by juxtaposing these two different lives on a political plane. The power Agamben (2005) defines is able to penetrate into the bare life, and this ability can be explained by the concept of exception. This concept can be defined as the state of volatility between the law and the power strategy of the sovereign (who politically administers the society) mandating all forms of life to sustain its own existence. The starting point of this biopolitical analysis, for example, is the contemplation on the relation between a war-related refugee influx (regulated by the UN Refugee Agency, and defined in international law as *taking shelter en masse*) and the “efforts to integrate new-comers/sub-population into local/upper-population”. In other words, this study deals with the power describing the complete relationship between human and nature, how it re-produces life dominating its own knowledge based on the binary opposition of local and non-local, which actually means deciding non-locals’ destiny corresponding to national-expedient targets.

The sovereign power is directly governed and shaped by international institutions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and domestic law. Still, the power claims its independence from the law; and this triggers a contradiction: The power is responsible for the existence and functioning of the law, yet this also elevates it to the position of a “decision-maker”. In Foucauldian terms, the power’s disciplinary intervention on population goes so far as to re-shaping the most natural forms of human life, including birth and death. Thus, it can define one’s both natural and social identity (Foucault, 2013). And this is the source of the mechanism transforming a human into a citizen. It is how the power subordinates an individual with rights and freedoms, and incorporates that individual into its order by categorizing her/him based on citizenship and nationality. Based on his own view on biopolitics, Agamben (1998, p.76-77) defines power as a mechanism assimilating the individual by penetrating into all segments of life, creating “life that does not deserve to live”, spying and controlling. According to him, the power creates a representational “camp” in the bare human life with “a constant state of exception or a zone of uncertainty”, and this camp is in practice the law of the modern power; camps are able to create and sustain the “state of

²⁰ Agamben, 2001, aktaran Sibel Yardımcı. Kentin Sınırında: Toplumsallaşmanın Yeni Metaforu Olarak “Kamp”. Skop Sanat Tarihi Eleştirisi. 1/1/2012. Skop Bülteni. <http://www.e-skop.com/skopbulten/kentin-sinirinda-toplumsallasmanin-yeni-metaforu-olarak-kamp/470>. (06.05.2016)



exception”, and individuals are subordinated to this state. Thus, the discourse abolishes normalcy and establishes itself fully authorized (Agamben, 1998, p.79).

Looking at the national newspapers, Turkish government has various methods to keep its authority over refugees and Kurds together by settling Syrian refugees into the villages where Alawite-Kurds live²¹: The newspaper *BirGün* claimed that the next target of the ruling party is to build a new refugee camp for 3 thousand persons in the middle of Mazgirt district of Tunceli (Dersim) province, which has 8 thousand Alawite-Kurdish people reside, with the purpose of changing the cultural and demographic structure in the district, which, inter alia, they have never received vote. There is a rumour in public that in 2019, in 5 years, Syrian refugees probably will have rights for having Turkish citizenships and vote, which means achieving political interest. *Cumhuriyet*, another national newspaper, announces that the camp in Kahramanmaraş province, in which 27 thousand refugees have been sheltered, will be moved into the Sivrice village²² -as a container city- where Alawite people belonging to the Bektashi order live as the Turkish-international paper *Hürriyet Daily News* has affirmed. This paper also mentions local peoples' historical experiences and fears.²³

Leaving aside the dynamics concerning the current government, political polarization, and othering within the smallest groups such as neighbourhoods and even family houses, one can observe that the integration issue and refugee rights are governed by a set of disconnected regulations - with the exception of the principles of Geneva Convention and the recent judicial implementations for the Syrian refugees. And due to individual preferences and practices, these regulations have little effect on the above mentioned issues. The result is a so-called integration ideal triggering contradictions both in the daily life and politics. As the influx of the refugee population continues en masse and displays regional intensities, if one refers to Agamben's terms, how can the power (which is expected to value the harmony between the daily life and political area) constructs any “integration” within an environment in which the local intersects the non-local?

Integration, which is in reality a version of exception, is a key step for employment. Adopting Wallerstein's approach, the anthropologist Özbudun discusses how communication processes provide benefits to capitalism: There emerges a labour force with few demands, working on little salary, and in unfavourable conditions. Wallerstein underlines how multicultural practices projecting migrants' socialization *to their own cultures and the capitalism*

²¹ BirGün Gazetesi, <http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/bir-suriyeli-multeci-kampi-da-dersim-e-mi-114183.html> Date of news: 01.06.2016, 02.07.2016. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/506152/Alevi_koyune_Suriyeli_kampi.html. Date of news: 02.07.2016, 03.07.2016.

²² The village of Dulkadiroğlu district.

²³ *The container city being built in Kahramanmaraş has already led to angry protests from local Alevi, who fear that the province's sensitive demography will be unsettled... "We are continuing to build three container cities. These will host 4,000 people in Hatay, in the Dutlubahçe neighborhood of the Yayladağı district; and 10,000 people in the Boynuyörgün neighborhood of the Altınözü district. The 25,000-person-capacity container city in Kahramanmaraş, in the Sivricebüyük village of Dulkadiroğlu district, is continuing to be built," said Ergün Turan, the president of TOKİ, a Prime Ministry-affiliated body, on April 17... "When the container city in Kahramanmaraş is completed, a living space much bigger than the facility in Elbeyli, which is the biggest temporary accommodation center in the world, will be constituted," Turan told the state-run Anadolu Agency, referring to the Elbeyli refugee camp in the southern province of Kilis... Earlier in April, locals from Sivricebüyük and other villages nearby rallied against plans to build a container city, with the village head, Mehmet Caner, saying that the refugee population would dwarf the number of local Alevi, who only number around 6,000... Through 1978 and 1980, in the run up to the Sept. 12, 1980 military coup d'état, Alevi were subjected to mass killings not only in Kahramanmaraş, then called Maraş, but also in Sivas and Çorum by ultra-nationalist groups... An appeal by villagers for "urgent stay of execution" in the container city plan has already been filed to an administrative court, with residents citing fears that "Syrian jihadists" would be settled nearby. http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/state-housing-agency-toki-building-three-container-cities-for-syrians-in-south-turkey.aspx?_pageID=517&nID=97964&NewsCatID=341 Date of news: 18.04.2016, 02.07.2016.*

creating hierarchies contribute to a decrease in migrants' wages (as cited in Özbudun, 2010: 60) The refugees in Turkey perfectly represent these economic characteristics. They are subject to a protection regime that reminds them of “temporariness” on every step (Yazgan et al., 2015). Not being granted work permits for starting small-scale businesses prevents them from establishing enterprises, and they are deprived of social security. Those starting small-scale businesses (e.g. shop owners) allegedly register their company under a local's name. As this is certainly not something the state cannot foresee, counter-measures rumoured to be in progress. Lack of social aid and deficiencies in medical services, unorganized activities and administrative issues of NGOs constantly disrupt efforts to meet refugees' major expectations. The language barrier hinders communicating and addressing basic demands, let alone social integration (Çomak, 2016). Currently, the emergence of an exception in which power infiltrates into the multiple layers of life abolishes distinctive and defining characteristics of those layers or assimilates by transforming them is contentious. Although the concept of exception here is not positive, it is important to note that the conditions in the Turkish refugee camps are not as terrifying as those in the Nazi camps of World War II for which the concept of the state of exception was developed. Turkish refugee camps do not display a state of exception where oppression, coercion, and a state of emergency are present. Here, however, one can just discuss the answer of “why most of the refugees want to leave Turkey and reach Europe?”

According to Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management and UNHCR Office in Ankara, and academics who are interested in immigration Syrian refugees' integration into the Turkish population is very much related to the government's efforts to meet the accommodation, education, and medical needs, along with other requirements concerning social participation.²⁴ Besides, political consequences of the interaction between two populations (host/guest or sub-/upper-population) with different historical backgrounds, economic, social and demographic experiences, should be planned ahead because of potential conflicts which are based upon cultural, economic and political matters. In fact, Robert Ezra Park does not find such potential conflicts extraordinary; on the contrary, they are very normal. They reproduce the point the government needs to be involved in order to reconstruct a peaceful environment. Then, at the final stage, full integration will be possible with structural, “social, economic and political inclusion of newcomers” (as cited in Kaiser and Kaya, 2016, p. 25-26). The legal and controlled integration of all refugees (in and outside of camps, registered and unregistered), that is to say, the *normalization* of social participation, requires long-term and well-considered government policies. In other words, whereas an exception has emerged in daily life, the power conceives nothing extraordinary (Baştürk, 2013). From a Foucauldian point of view, one requires a new form of administration to reproduce life (Foucault, 2013). Otherwise, and ironically, what is foreseen by politicians is that social, economic, and political chaos that simultaneously offers a critique of the power's administration and triggers the desire for the exception seems inevitable.

When it comes to the recent developments, everyone has witnessed so far that the political approaches of the government in 2022 show that humanitarianism to Syrians has never been left aside for years. President Erdoğan keeps mentioning that the Turkish government will

²⁴ For instance, participation in the labour market or in education are the forms of social participation. However, it is not easy to observe “immigrants' social and political participation in the integration process” immediately, because “it will largely be limited to those forms of social participation that imply involvement in decision-making processes”. See Report of Council of Europe, 1999. “Political and social participation of immigrants through consultative bodies”. Directorate of Social and Economic Affairs.



never send the Syrians back as part of his stronger anti-Asad policy. In passing 57,000 homes has built-in Idlib for Syrian people and the promise that 100,000 more will be built in Azez, Al Bab, Jarablus, and Tal Abyad was given. According to UN Reports, Turkey has sent more than 500,000 but the data is not good enough because a remarkable number of the returns have not been recorded. Nevertheless, the voices rising from the neighbourhoods and districts where Turkish citizens- especially the ones having stronger nationalist emotions and demands- living with the Syrian people -in point of fact nobody knows who is registered, who is not- generally point out “uncontrollably disorganized Syrian population”, and such a reaction put the political power-in-charge in an awkward position, especially in terms of the upcoming election in 2023.²⁵ This election is very important for Erdoğan because he and his political party have been announcing their “2023 Goals” the supervision and control on the Syrian populations living in the districts have increased. However, it is the fact that nobody can hope that the normalization of social participation which is based on social and political inclusion can not be possible and a sustainable extension is inevitable as long as when it comes to a high population of citizens who are always defensive to foreigners, who are adept at changing every element of their native lands into “border” metaphorically force the government and all the related authorities to close the “open doors”. In addition, what one must remember that such a person or citizen, itself, as a body and a mentality, is a biopolitical product.

Influences of the Culture of Fear

Any discussion on the biopolitics of war refugees would require considering issues such as the reason for war, the refugee's intention or reluctance to return, and the duration of her/his stay. Both governments and local populations assume that this period is only “temporary” and will come to an end “when the war ends”. Although their desire to return cannot be guaranteed by international bodies, media channels, and research on the adverse social conditions of refugees, they are still expected to stay until the political and social structures of their home countries are recovered.

Refugees in Turkey have been distributed into varying social and economic settings, and their number is constantly increasing. Since their return to Syria is temporarily suspended due to the war and the political crisis, another issue requiring a solution is their acceptance by the locals. Regional financial crisis due to the increasing illegal work force and decreasing wages, socio-cultural issues of crime and security, a growing number of beggars due to lack of accommodation, and disputes driven by distinct socialization practices (Boyraz, 2015:50-57) add up to the alienating, contemptuous, and judging attitudes of the hosting population towards refugees. Moreover, building suburbs in non-cosmopolite cities²⁶, the settlement policy recently put into practice by the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) limits refugees' mobility and turns the existing conflicts into discriminations over identities. Different from the “camp policy”, “suburb-policy” gives refugees the right to decide on the provinces in which they would like to reside. This project which is based on so-called “free residence” does not influence inner-city mobility but does intercity-mobility and,

²⁵ Kelly Pettillo, the program coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Program, “Turkey’s open door closes: how Europe can better support Syrian Refugees” <https://ecfr.eu/article/turkeys-open-door-closes-how-europe-can-better-support-syrian-refugees/> Visited: 02.12.2022.

²⁶ The project covers 62 cities except for İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Antalya, Bursa. The refugees are not allowed to reside in metropolises.

refugees must report to the police stations and give an autograph “daily, one day or two days a week” to prove that they are living in the cities that the government send them to. Thus, refugees’ inter-city mobility is controlled, and they are kept under administrative guard (Başak, 2011, Kahya, 2014).

Collecting sociological and psychological observations from the field, “Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research” (Erdoğan, 2015) asks locals whether they agree with the opinion that “refugees should be sent back to their country even if war does not end” to understand locals’ reception of Syrians. The results show that 63% disagree with the opinion. Removing “war” from the statement, one observes a decrease in the number of people who disagree to 48%. Although researchers find the initial number “valuable”, it does not seem that good based on humanitarian values. The decrease when war is removed from the equation underlines conscientious responsibility and sensitivity towards war. The most important finding of the research is the need to cultivate a *culture of acceptance* for the following reason: 77% of the respondents believe that having Syrians in Turkey for a longer term would lead to issues, whereas this number rises up to 82% in regions where the Syrian population is larger (Erdoğan, 2015, p. 36-37). The research titled “Syrian Refugees and Turkey’s Challenges: Going beyond Hospitality” authored by Kemal Kirişçi (2014) reveals that 86% of the respondents believe that the influx of refugees should stop, whereas 30% want them to go back. In his research²⁷, Kirişçi (2014, p. 28) claims that the local population does not welcome regular migration. When asked how satisfied they are with the camp administration and staff, refugees within Yıldız’s (2013, p.157) research report organizational issues, poor management, and othering (contemning being “asylum-seekers”, not being an Arab; being treated like a beggar) practices.

According to Furedi, such social experiences have their roots in glorifying security and the resulting feelings of reservation and anxiety. Then one can infer that the culture of fear outweighs the culture of acceptance. The fear of foreigners and the feeling of insecurity in relationships affect daily life. People’s perception of each other gradually changes, and the dream for a better life puts greater distances between people, and they tend to avoid risks. Weakening traditions and the lack of a relevant social contract trigger all these (Furedi, 2014, p.204). Furedi’s (2014, p.205) concept of *war of culture* is of utmost importance here, as one witnesses the politicization of morality in Turkey (like in many other countries). In a setting where the borders between right and wrong, free and forbidden, guilt and innocence are vague, people get nervous and reserved, and social solidarity remains unrealized.

Newcomers’/sub-population’s integration into locals/upper-population, governments’ acts of exception, and cooperation between refugees in their efforts to participate in social and cultural life are closely related to locals’ and the public’s acceptance and support for refugees. Durkheim (1964) underlines the importance of social cooperation and intermediary institutions (religious institutions, associations, etc.) to protect the unity of society and to create collective (rather than individual) benefits to escape from a purely individualist approach. However, his emphasis on the collective consciousness and the feeling of unity confronts with the inconsistent relationality between the power and the subject. Born in such relationality, this cooperation is deeply associated with the humanist re-shaping of the *fear of “other”*, which is the main constituent of fearism - and *fearism* grows out of liberal-humanitarian

²⁷ Find the pdf: <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Syrian-Refugees-and-Turkeys-Challenges-May-14-2014.pdf>



citizenship discourses and pedagogical discourses (Zembylas, 2010, p.32). *Xenophobia* related categorizations such as exclusion/inclusion, originality/mimicry, us/them might be *potentially* emerging. Tyler (2006) suggests that humanitarian discourses, unlike Xenophobic discourses, want the public to identify 'the human face' of specific asylum seekers/refugees' to make people think that they are "just like us". Such close-up technologies are very beneficial for recognizing 'the victims' of repressive asylum laws; these strategies attempt to reposition asylum-seekers as subjects who matter, 'like us'. Humanitarian 'subjects'...use the frame of their own visibility to make asylum seekers visible..." (Tyler, 2006, p.194). The critical point here is how asylum seekers or refugees are constructed latently as "them" by social institutions, even by humanitarian agencies. Any such critical stance in Turkey can only be achieved through the problematization of strong nationalist education curricula.

In the meantime, social reflections of the culture of fear are not directly affected by individual feelings or political sensibilities infiltrated into society, especially by politicians. On the contrary, fear emerges in individuals, and it is directed towards others; and thus, fear turns into a relational mode disciplining bodies based on a special feeling of belonging. This is how fear produces fearful subjects in relation with hellish *others* and secures the border between us and them the boundary between "what I am" and "which I am not" is the fear itself (Zembylas, 2008, p.70, 2010, p.32-33). Fear helps certain bodies settle into the public space and grants free movement, whereas it restricts others into enclosed areas - just like nation-states. Claiming to sustain the welfare and the character of their country, nation-states develop policies to deny "illegal", unqualified refugees and fake asylum seekers entry. As a nation-state, Turkey is no exception to the abovementioned political attitude. Nevertheless, Turkey shows political support and hospitality towards foreign victims (treating them of their own) with historical sensibilities towards "Islam" and "Turkic origins", and Syrians refugees fall into this category. Domestic polarizations such as othering Kurdish, Alawite, and Armenian populations, however, remain unresolved. Public service announcements and fundraising appeals on the news demand that refugees are granted their basic human rights and treated within moral boundaries, rather than presenting them as a threat against national belonging. On a local level, however, one can observe that the "*we*" who are closely associated with "*others*" are uncomfortable with and prejudiced against them. This reality mimics Western politics: binary oppositions of bare life/political being and exclusion/inclusion exist despite of all hospitable elements. It reminds one of the pedagogical contradictions in which nationalist education regulations do not have any space for recognition/acceptance/approval of foreigners, whereas it teaches public morality and humanitarian values. As Agamben puts it, politics exists because man lives in language defining who he actually is. "As a living being he separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to bare life in an inclusive exclusion" (Agamben, 1998, p. 38).

Announcing the Council of Higher Education's (CoHE) decision to allow Syrian students to study in Turkish universities, Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay²⁸ said "Humanitarian sensibilities, neighbour relations, and international law commit Turkey to welcome and host Syrian citizens". Ankara University's TÖMER has also announced the opening of additional Turkish classes. The rapid transformation of the refugee population within the camp settings undoubtedly means socio-political cautiousness. Negative reactions (mainly on social media) of university students who have already taken an entrance exam (along with their families),

²⁸ Press conference. 20 October 2012 cited by Ali Rıza Seydi, 2014. p. 281.

however, prove that the binary opposition between us and them outweighs “peaceful” recognition/acceptance/approval elements, the culture of acceptance actually leads to *deconstruction*, and inclusive exclusion is still valid for the foreigner.

In 2022, the revision of the experiences of and with the Syrian refugees shows that both culturally approved and politically-pedagogically based “norms of being citizenship” producing binary oppositions of bare life/political being and exclusion/inclusion have not been left aside. The conditions like demanding and/or putting limitations on the Syrian migrants have been increased for years and “full-acceptance” is appearing as hope or imagination.

Conclusion

What exactly is the position of the refugee subject (who is allowed a cross-border entry), when the laws defining her/him based on her/his identity and act in contradiction with her/his natural rights and freedoms and thus create a dilemma? How should one “read” his/her future?

Defining the instruments of discursive human rights and freedoms, Foucault tells us that this is how an individual participates into social relations as a subject, and (again on a discursive level) life is organized with those instruments. Here discourses require different institutional creations and norms to subjectify the refugee. Refugee rights are no different than the natural rights of other subjects who are defined as citizens, and refugees cannot be separated from the rule of the power as all subjects gain their rights through the politics. Then one should acknowledge the fact that life is, under all circumstances, surrounded by the power.

Although the main constituents of integration share similarities (employment, education, medical services, life spaces, etc.), geographical and socio-cultural specificities require political, sociological, and anthropological instruments not only for an act of exception, but also for trans-national peace initiatives.

In the anthropological texts, as in Baus’s article (2009), “creolization” means “localized”. The word refers to a culture which reflects single entity that has pure boundaries; the boundaries that *never cannot be pluralize*. They represent a geographical area which does not open for any possible multicultural structure. The boundaries are defended against outsiders, and identity, language, customs, traditions, even daily practices, all cultural aspects shortly, have to be maintained and transmitted to the next generations (Baus, 2009)²⁹. Similarly, culture of war is an important consequence of othering in parts of Anatolia where anthropological fictions are not heterogeneous, especially when the national values are “threatened”. One can expect that the power will engage in immediate adaptation efforts to create a culture of acceptance; in other words, prioritize exceptional approximations (prioritize exceptional settings where populations familiarize themselves on the(ir) 'other'). However and remarkably, the news, reviews of research reports and articles reveal the fact that even Islam, which is the most attractive principle for power today, has nothing to offer for “unity in diversity” when it comes to the ideal/social order.

²⁹ The paragraph is a short summary of certain pages. For detailed anthropological thoughts and examinations, see Daniela Baus’s paper titled “Cultural Exchange in a heterogeneous research field approaching scientific culture with Anthropological thought”. Pages 96-99.



The analysis of public discourses loaded with anti-other judgments in Turkey is on the power's agenda. The subjective results of the research certainly depend on the historical functioning of the most fundamental principle(s) of the discourse. That is to say, for Syrian refugees in Turkey, the integration process will be designed based on the power's projection of social order, the desire to sustain the status quo, nationalistic and homogenizing ideals and surely political interests. Thus, it is possible to observe a manner that is performed by a state of exception while evaluating Turkish government's political approach to Syrian refugees. And if one needs to "read" or "say" something about their future in Turkey, the explanation presents two options for them: first, they can choose to live on an edge that "bare life" and practices of "state of exception" which let them live a life as "included", stigmatized them as "excluded" or they can choose to live in another "modern" country.

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