

Sources of Irregularity and Managing Migration: The Case of Turkey

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Abstract

This paper examines immigration and irregularity in times of both economic growth and recession in Turkey with reference to a conflict model of migration. Dealing effectively with irregularity requires a wider-than-migration perspective, and regional and global cooperation between all stakeholders, including governments and individuals, to curtail. Many of the reasons for irregular migration lie in policies and practices which aim to control migration. Turkey provides an example of a rapidly growing economy in a region of conflicts, attracting immigrants from its immediate neighbourhood and beyond, and highlighting the need for cooperation among all countries involved to manage this migration. Nevertheless, the current immigration regime in Turkey is open to generate more irregular migration.

Keywords: migration management; irregular migration; conflicts; crisis; human mobility; asylum; apprehensions.

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Introduction: Irregularity in human mobility

During the 2008-09 recession, the volume of remittances received by developing countries was relatively stable (Sirkeci, Cohen, and Ratha, 2012). International human mobility must consider internal and international moves along a continuum, so that movers and non-movers are part of the same phenomenon triggered by more or less same set of factors (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011). Human mobility that is resilient to crises may also resist tighter control efforts, as when migration control efforts are considered within a conflict framework where the moving agent (i.e. individual or group) is challenging the controlling agent (e.g. visa and border officers and legal frameworks).

When there is conflict between the moving agents and controlling agents, ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ mobility can be two sides of a coin, as reflected in governments that talk of ‘managing migration’ rather than controlling it. This change of language implies an understanding and acceptance of the fact that migration cannot be totally controlled, as changes in legislation and check-point procedures might merely change the ways in which migration occurs as when guest workers in one period later become asylum seekers or ‘illegal’ or ‘illegal’ migrants.

Labelling migrants by their motivations or putting them in administrative categories may serve some purposes, but does not fully reflect the multiple motivations and complex set of factors behind individual migration decisions. Ethno-political drivers of international migration for certain countries and groups around the world, for instance, can be obscured by such categories. Migration of Turkey’s Kurds shows how migrants change from ‘guest workers’ to ‘family migrants’ to ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers’, and finally to ‘illegals’ and ‘irregulars’ over five decades (Sirkeci, 2003 and 2006). These categories only reflect the sovereign states’ view of migrating people and changes in rules and regulations which often lead to changes in migration mechanisms used by movers. These rules and views are the sources of ‘irregularity’ in human mobility. People do migrate ‘irregularly’ out of necessity, often when there is little chance of ‘regular’ ways being available. This paper explores the sources of irregularity in migration to Turkey.

It is argued that movers and non-movers are connected so do irregular migrants and regular migrants as well as internal and international moves (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011). These are part and parcel of the same phenomenon; human mobility. Short term approaches and measures will not help in migration management as this requires a wider long term view as well as regional and global cooperation between stakeholders including governments, communities, and individuals. The house metaphor used by Martin (2013) illustrates that regular, irregular and temporary migration are different facets of human mobility occurring in the same “house” and thus we need to consider them together.

If we follow on with the house metaphor, when the front door is firmly shut, some might be invited through the side door while others (i.e. unwanted ones) may try the rear door. Thus, overall, migration takes its dynamic nature from the very fact that behind every move there is some kind of conflict which is defined in very broad terms. It is not only armed clashes or violence per se but it refers to any situation where parties involved have a conflict of interest; ranging from minor disagreements and tensions to armed clashes and wars (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011; Sirkeci, 2009a; Sirkeci 2006).

Within the context of conflicts, individuals, households and groups assess the situation and their perception of the conflict determines their decisions to move or to stay. These conflicts are defined very broadly by borrowing from Dahrendorf’s description where anything ranging from a latent disagreement to violent and armed clashes are considered within the spectrum of conflict. Thus it refers to any disagreement and any conflict of interest including for example, family feud, tensions between siblings, tough competition for jobs or businesses, as well as political pressures and armed ethnic clashes. The perception of the seriousness of these conflicts is a subjective matter. Therefore not everybody wishes to migrate or moves as their perceptions differ. Perception of the environment of human (in)security which is measured again on a continuous scale. Environment of human insecurity is a notion which could be formulated as a composite perception of an environment

where material indicators such as income levels, employment, and physical risks are bundled with non-material issues such as cultural and political rights and freedoms, language barriers, discrimination and so on (Sirkeci, 2005, 2006). It is a reflection of the conflict(s) as perceived by individuals. Perception of higher level of human insecurity may lead individuals to decide to move whereas perception of low level of human insecurity (or relative human security) may lead to a decision to stay put. Dynamic nature of the perception of conflicts and human insecurity also allows us to see the dynamic nature of migration.

We can summarise the premises of a conflict model of migration in eight linked hypotheses:


1. The stronger the disagreement/conflict, the greater the perception of human insecurity,
2. Stronger the perception of human insecurity, higher the likelihood of migration,
3. The more resourceful the individual/household/group, the higher the likelihood of international migration,
4. Stronger the perception of human security in a given destination country, higher the likelihood of migration to that country,
5. Once individual or group moves into a country that they perceive as an environment of relative security, it is likely that new tensions arise; which affects the country of destination, host society as well as future migration prospects (e.g. return migration) and attitudes towards investment (e.g. remittance patterns).
6. Common perceptions of human insecurity in countries may cause high levels of emigration from these countries whilst perceptions of human security in countries can attract incoming flows to those countries perceived as secure.
7. Migration experience is built over time within households, communities, and groups and in return a culture of migration emerges to make migration a popular and possibly more frequent strategic option when difficulties, tensions and conflicts arise in a particular location.
8. The conflicts may arise due to incoming flows and immigrants may face an environment of insecurity in destination countries. This may be expressed, for example, in the form of xenophobia or discrimination. Thus, return migration or migration to another country becomes a compelling option.

Within this framework, what separates irregular migration from regular moves is simply the absence of valid authorisation to enter or stay, in other words irregularity of the registration within national administrative systems. Exclusively referring to the legal status but not the human person (Abrosini, 2013:3), irregular migrants are those foreign residents without a legal resident status and/or permit to stay in a given country. For this type of move, illegal migration, clandestine migration, and undocumented migration were the terms we used previously and the very same terminology is widely criticised for ambiguities and inconsistencies (Triandafyllidou, 2010). Within the conflict model of migration, irregular migration may sometimes represent the very environment of human insecurity, particularly when it involves unauthorised border crossings and/or living in limbo for long periods in transit and in destination countries. The truth is that the ways in which the rules of admission and migration is set and implemented determine the (ir)regularity of migration and migrants' status (e.g. Bommers and Sciortino, 2011). Restrictive rules that meet strong pressure for emigration elsewhere simply triggers irregular migration, which then leads to stricter and harsher border patrol regimes. This forces potential migrants to reconsider their perceptions of environment of human insecurity at home as insecurity and risk associated with border crossing may become bigger. However, sources of irregularity vary. Many irregular migrants are simply visa overstayers, for instance.

Nevertheless, people move for multiple reasons, including jobs, employment, and income. The key to success in controlling/managing [labour] migration lies with controlling the labour market in any given country as well as protecting workers across borders. At least in theory, once all economically active population is registered then there will be virtually no irregular labour migrant. The bigger question for policy makers and other stakeholders is why do we need/want to control the labour market? What are the conflicting interests among stakeholders? There can be structural problems

preventing governments properly registering immigrants or it can simply be a lousy system indifferent to the issue because of different purpose of the initial design.

Figure 1. Immigration, migrant stock and illegal migration in the USA, 1850-2010



Source: Martin (2013)

Immaterial to our responses to above questions, migration is here to stay. To illustrate the longevity in human mobility, we begin with statistics on immigration and immigrant stock in the USA, the biggest immigration nation in the world (Figure 1). There one can see, for example, the emergence and growth of irregular migration in the USA from the 1990s and onwards. Nevertheless, it would be surprising if trends and patterns are categorically different for Turkey. Immigration in Turkey has also been moderated by wars and conflicts as well as changes in legislation and politics (both in Turkey and elsewhere). Besides, migration to Turkey is largely influenced by Turkish migrants and minorities abroad. This is why countries such as Germany and Bulgaria are top of the immigration league in Turkey (Sirkeci, 2009b). Turkey has seen large influxes of refugees following acute crises in its region such as Iraqi Kurds running away from Saddam Hussein’s troops in the late 1980s, Turks fleeing Todor Zhivkov’s Bulgaria in the same period. More recently there have been similar sudden influxes from Syria, the numbers of whom exceeded 600,000 officially in less than two years. Individual countries’ own migration and asylum legislation can turn these immigrants either into refugees and asylum seekers or push them into irregularity and illegality. Bulgarian Turks can be an example for the former while many Africans and Asians who have no legal permission to enter the country and end up in boats on the Aegean shores fall into the latter.

Hence we argue that emerging economic attractiveness and political stability in Turkey as well as cultural and geographical proximity to conflict areas in the region suggest the country to appeal more immigrants. This is coinciding with the established culture of migration facilitating migration from former destination countries in Europe to Turkey as in the case of migration from Germany. Despite the new legislation introduced in 2013, however, Turkey is faced with the difficulty of receiving many who come from countries in conflict such as Syria. Therefore, irregularity is going to be a main challenge in years to come.

Competition over jobs, employment opportunity and income is a major drive for human mobility around the world today. Thus economic aspects are often the focus of migration management debates. Socio-economic wealth of key countries make these places top destinations for most migrants. Movers and their households consider job opportunities and income levels often along with other aspects, such as education, health, and political securities while forming a decision. Turkey is also popular for more or less the same reasons. For example, being near to the wealthiest regional


union of the world (i.e. EU) can be considered a bonus which attracts migrants. Analysis of a few economic indicators and GDP per capita as a proxy for economic well-being indicates why Turkey would be more popular a destination compared to some other countries.¹

Turkey and the neighbourhood: Attracting movers

Turkey’s economy seems to have remained more or less stable during the present economic crisis. According to the World Bank Financial Crisis Survey 2010, only about one third of firms in Turkey reported a decrease in sales while 41% reporting an increase and 22% were stable during 2008 and 2009 (World Bank, 2011). Moreover business remained very optimistic as 58% were expecting an increase during 2010 and 2011 in the same survey. In the same period, we have also seen a significant economic growth as per capita income² continued to increase despite a small decline in 2009.

Economically Turkey has become the second best destination choice for migrants in the region who cannot or do not want to move to the EU. Its GDP per capita is not yet at European levels, but well above the world average, and significantly higher than European and Central Asian (ECA) developing economies, whereas three times higher than Syria and four times higher than Iraq. This is not to suggest that GDP per capita is the most meaningful or most important indicator but, after examining a series of other macro indicators, it has the merit of being familiar to most audiences. Overall, the important fact is that Turkey is economically, politically and culturally attractive to people in its region and beyond. Whether this is a good or bad thing depends on Turkey’s ability to absorb and utilise this potential as the country currently facing the challenge of the arrival of over 600,000 Syrians since 2012.

Figure 2: GDP per capita PPP (in current prices US\$)



The numbers of immigrants in Europe and the rest of the world continued to increase during the current crisis (Sirkeci et al. 2012). Figures 3 and 4 show immigrant populations from 1960 till 2010 in world regions and some selected countries of destination. Particularly the later period from 2005 to 2010 clearly witnessed and overall increase in international human mobility during the financial crisis. This was accompanied with continued increase in remittances flows during the crisis (Sirkeci et al., 2012). Turkey, with a growing economy and -despite some serious flaws- a functioning de-

¹ GDP per capita is not the best instrument but in this case it is more or less illustrative of differences and similarities for our discussion of immigration, though readers are to be cautious in interpreting these for themselves.

² GNI per capita using Atlas Method.

mocracy, has a world-wide appeal to those seeking human security. Its predominantly Muslim population and pro-Islamic government make it particularly attractive to those with Muslim background. This may not be welcome news for those aspiring to control migration because this very region is also plagued with various conflicts costing many lives on a daily basis (e.g. Iraq, Syria, Palestine, etc.). Nevertheless, if we refer back to the initial hypotheses about conflict and migration, a next door safe haven will surely attract many.

Figure 3: Stocks of immigrant population in by regions, 1960 – 2010.





Figure 4: Stocks of immigrant population in selected countries




Source: World Bank and Federal Bureau of Statistics Germany

Whilst being a relatively attractive destination, Turkey is also geographically easy to reach from the currently troubled countries such as Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Afghanistan and so on. Given the fact that Iraq and Afghanistan are the leading source countries in the world refugee numbers league table, Turkey is now facing a bigger dilemma. Turkey's visa and asylum regime have been rather tight. Officially Turkey does not accept 'refugees' from non-European countries. The Syrian crisis put this stance in a test. Turkey officially refers to these as 'guests' under protection, but in practice everybody else including low and mid-rank government officials refer to them as 'refugees'. However, as we know from the cases in Europe and elsewhere as the numbers of asylum seekers grows, Turkish public opinion turns against these vulnerable people. This requires delicate handling and something to be managed well particularly at times of crisis.

Once the borders are tightened and the admission rules are stricter, human mobility seeks other ways and means to overcome them. This is just another case of conflict (of interests between governments and individuals, households and groups). Hence, irregular migration is one of the moving agents' responses to regulations. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, irregular migration and the linked issues of migrant trafficking and smuggling were mentioned as "growing concerns" in Europe (Haug et al. 2002:26). Figure 5 shows the situations and controls leading to irregularity.

Thus, the difficulties in getting permission or renewing such permissions is perhaps the main source of irregularity not only in Turkey but elsewhere too. As shown in Figure 5, this may be initiated before entering the country or in due course following an authorised entry and/or stay. Nevertheless, as the lower part of the graph illustrates, there are also irregular exits.

Figure 5: Becoming irregular in Turkey



The total number of irregular migrants in the USA grew from 3.5 million in 1995 to nearly 12 million today, whilst in Europe the same figure was estimated to be around 2.6 million in 1991 (Böhning, 1992). An estimated 350,000 migrants were also believed to enter Europe illegally dur-

ing the early 1990s (Widgren, 1994; ICMPD, 1999). Given the fact that immigration rules are tighter and border controls are strengthened in Europe, we can only expect these figures to be much larger today. However, it is important to recognise that there is no reason to suppose that the overall profile of those in irregular situations is much different from “legal” or “regular” migrants (Salt and Clarke, 2002:27). According to a recent study, total volume of irregular foreign residents in 27 EU member countries is estimated to be between 1.82 million to 3.26 million (Kovacheva and Vogel, 2009). The maximum estimation of 3.26 million corresponds to 11.3% of the total foreign population in the EU27 (28,931,683) and 0.6% of total population.

Table 1: Asylum applications and apprehensions in Turkey, 1995-2013

	Asylum applications (persons)		Apprehended undocumented migrants	
	By Gen. Dir. Sec.	By UNHCR Turkey	By Gen. Dir. Sec.	
1995	2,017	3,977	11,362	
1996	2,617	4,435	18,804	
1997	3,898	4,641	28,439	
1998	4,498	7,330	29,426	
1999	5,390	7,309	47,529	
2000	4,985	7,019	94,514	
2001	5,693	6,675	92,365	
2002	3,525	4,331	82,825	
2003	2,563	4,280	56,219	
2004	3,041	3,934	61,228	
2005	2,935	3,914	57,428	
2006	3,550	4,553	51,983	
2007	5,882	7,646	64,290	
2008	12,002	12,981	65,737	
2009	6,792	7,834	34,345	
2010	8,932	9,226	32,667	
2011	17,925	10,964	44,415	
2012	29,678	14,051	47,510	
2013	30,311	13,703	39,888	
Total	156,202	138,803	960,974	


Source: Ministry of Interior (2013); Foreigners Borders and Asylum of the General Directorate of Security (Turkey); UNHCR (Turkey); Sirkeci (2009b).

These estimations are useful and indicative of trends however, the figures and estimates for Turkey are significantly different. The available data by official sources in Turkey show that over 960,974 irregular migrants were apprehended by Turkish security forces in between 1995 and 2013 (Table 1). A significant proportion of those were deported while some applied for asylum or stayed in country for various reasons. Nevertheless, some may have joined the ranks of irregular immigrants as there are many ways to become irregular in the country (Figure 5). In the same period, over 150,000 asylum applications³ were filed in Turkey. Despite these substantial figures, the total number of non-Turkish citizen foreign born in Turkey is estimated to be over quarter of a million (Sirkeci and Zeyneloglu, 2014). If proportions were similar to the EU27, irregular migrants in Turkey should have been around only about 30,000. Nevertheless, Turkey’s experience with irregular migration is apparently different than her EU partners given the significantly large numbers of apprehensions reported over the last two decades.

³ This excludes the number of Syrians who entered Turkey between 2011 and 2014 in reaction to the crisis in Syria.

Human mobility, by its very nature of regular and irregular flows, makes such counts and registers very difficult to maintain, particularly when sizeable numbers are involved as well as conflicting priorities among the authorities taking registers. In theory, the number of entries to a country would be equal to the sum of the number of exits and net migration. However, records in many countries do not add up. Some countries do not take registers on exit, some makes estimations based on sample surveys. Entries and exits in Turkey are checked against a data base of individuals flagged by authorities. Therefore each check is recorded. These records are used to generate entry and exit statistics. Due to this particular motivation beneath, these figures are questionable. However, Turkish institutions including ministries report these figures. Accordingly, these border statistics between 1994 and 2012, there were a total of 1,971,101 more exits than entries for Turkish citizens (Figure 7). Except 2000 and 2001, when there were more Turkish citizens returning than exiting through Turkish borders, this has been a consistent pattern for the last 18 years. This may indicate up to about 1.9 million Turkish citizens left the country over the period but we cannot be sure. In the same period, there were 6,059,050 more entries than exits by foreign citizens. Except 2008-2009, the number of entries are persistently higher than the number of exits. Even if we consider that a good number of entry-exit records are multiple trips of same individuals, it still leaves a substantial balance to ponder about. These differences in entry and exit numbers can be considered as indication of a significantly large irregular immigrant population in Turkey.⁴ They may also be an indication of irregularity and how common and easy it can be. However, the technical and procedural reasons beneath the numbers are unknown yet.

Figure 7. Number of entries and the balance after exits deducted, 1995-2012



Source: Turkish border statistics, General Directorate of Security.

Managing migration in peace and war and growth and crisis

Managing migration is a challenge and a further challenge is managing the migrants and migrant workers once they are in the country. It is widely accepted that there is a correlation between irreg-

⁴ However, these figures are clearly not an accurate register of entries and exits to Turkey but a total number of checks carried out against a list of individuals of concern and then entered onto a system where multiple entries for same individuals appear. Therefore should not be interpreted as accurate register of border crossings.

ular migration and regular migration as the networks established by the latter often do facilitate irregular migration. These networks frequently determine the destination countries and destination areas within those countries. Equally important is that these informal networks also serve a function in getting migrants into jobs. A recent study from Spain suggests that migrants who found their first job through informal networks (i.e. friends and family) are likely to experience downward social mobility compared to those who went through formal recruitment channels (Vono-de-Vilhena and Vidal-Coso, 2012: 242). We can then argue that ensuring formal channels are made available and accessible for migrant workers (regular or irregular alike) will result in a healthier social mobility pattern.

EU directive 2009/52/EC provides minimum common standards on sanctions and measures against the employment of “illegal” (let’s say irregular) migrants. According to this directive, employers are obliged to:

1. Require non-EU nationals to produce a residence permit or another authorisation to stay before taking up employment,
2. Keep copies of the permit or authorisation for the duration of the employment, in case of inspection by the national authorities,
3. Notify the authorities within the period established by the Member State when they employ a non-EU national.

This is part of a long term effort to prevent illegal migration in Europe. Existing EU directives and various legislations available at national levels may be just enough to do the job. However it requires determination to implement and sanction these laws and regulations. This, in turn, often requires rather democratic structures and quasi- and non-governmental bodies’ involvement in the process, such as agencies, boards, or committees that irregular migrants can approach and file complaints with, without the fear of persecution. The dilemma is obvious of course.

We would like to draw attention to a few cases of population fluxes in the Turkish neighbourhood. The recent history of the Middle East has many examples of population movements in response to drastic events and wars. Saddam Hussein’s attack on Kurds in the late 1980s and invasion of Iraq in the 1990s and, finally, the invasion in 2003 have resulted in massive displacements in the region (Sirkeci, 2005). Estimates go up to 5 million. Following the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006, smaller scale but similar moves were reported (Hourani and Sensenig-Dabbous, 2007). Now Turkey is facing a new influx of refugees from neighbouring Syria, and this is also the case for other countries in the region as well (van Vliet and Hourani, 2012).

It is important to understand that categories like irregular, regular, illegal, legal are mainly only administrative labels. Human migration, independent of labels given continues in response to a wide variety of conflicts –tensions, disagreements, dislikes, fights, and wars- as mentioned earlier. Hence the governance of migration requires a comprehensive understanding and approach towards the root causes and patterns of migration with a focus on alleviating these root causes rather than attempting to stop migration. Controlling migration in this sense is generally futile as documented and discussed by consecutive surveys (Cornelius et al. 1994, Cornelius et al. 2004, Cornelius & Salehyan, 2007).

It is also important to understand that migrants are humans on the move, and governments have a duty and moral obligation to protect and serve them, just as they have for non-movers. Governments and mainstream political parties in established immigration countries tend to simply exploit the situation and thus inflate the anxiety over immigration and immigrants. This in turn adds fuel to the fire and feeds into hostilities, new and old. The UK is probably one such case, where despite all of the anti-immigration discourses of consecutive governments and the mainstream media, immigration flows and stocks increased over the last decade. The only change is some immigrants and visible minorities have become subjects of abuse and hate crimes.

During the global financial crisis, a number of governments have been concerned about working conditions of migrant workers. This was mostly “to prevent immigrant labour undercutting local

workers or to curb exploitation of foreign workers by employers” (OECD, 2010:56). This is in line with the efforts of the International Organisation for Migration for the rights-based migration management. Hence the key to success in migration management lies with universal protection for workers which is only possible with a transnational approach in the governance of migration. The IOM has a key role to play in this regard.

It is also important to integrate a return-of-citizens approach in policies. Many countries already introduced policies promoting return of their citizens or former citizens home. Overall, there is evidence that many sending countries are increasingly interested in and engaging with their “diasporas” including Turkey. These flows once achieved can reverse the “brain drain” but more importantly attract a good deal of skilled and experienced workers and entrepreneurs whose integration may be smoother than others. Besides, there is also a great deal of interest in remittance flows. Many small economies are almost dependent on the remittances they receive from diasporas. Turkey is also receiving a decent share of these flows (Figure 5). However in a recent study, we have found that very few countries are directly targeting their diasporas in order to attract FDI. Yet, re-ethnicisation efforts of many governments such as Mexico are visible. These can be considered among positive effects of international human mobility. Equally important is the effects of immigration on labour market and wages in the country. In the USA, for instance, some argue that migrants depress wages (Borjas, 2003) while others claim it increases natives’ income (Otaviano and Peri, 2005).

Transnationalism dictates present day lives And the same goes for countries and governing bodies. Increasing penetration of internet, relatively inexpensive travel and communication costs and ubiquity of mobile services are facilitators of increasing transnational connectedness. This means perhaps adding fuel to the fire regarding international mobility. Some may hope it can also make the travel futile and unnecessary. Nevertheless, as shown earlier, numbers of movers are growing and yet even larger volumes of us are transnationally mobile. Perhaps billions of international trips are registered every year because of increasing transnationality. London’s five airports see about 200 million passengers pass their gates per annum (CAA, 2012) with some of us are making multiple trips while others stay a little longer and some constantly circulate between places. Admitting this ‘super-mobility’ allows us to examine new features such as consumer segments called “transnational mobiles”, and “circulating customers”.

A similar super mobility is evident for financial exchanges as very large amounts are circulating through the veins of global financial system. Financial moves do not face many obstacles. Some global banks are proud to be our ‘local banks’. With some difficulty on the way, migrants across the world are also able to send remittances worth around 700 billion dollars every year. This figure is larger than the GDPs of vast majority of countries in the world. Families, friends and communities around the world are living on these small amounts received from their migrant siblings, children, parents, and friends. Such super mobility creates transnational firms, large and small alike, while also creating transnational families. For example, one can accommodate three countries’ citizenships within one family: one can be British with a [naturalised] German brother and a Turkish sister left behind in Turkey while parents are Turkish who migrated from Iran three decades ago. Hence this transnational family lives in four cities in three countries while connecting four countries in terms of origin and culture. This is far from being a lone case. This reality is perhaps seen less clearly by those governments trying to control migration. Therefore it is imperative for governments to step up transnational efforts in managing human mobility across the world. A transnational approach requires a cooperative approach and cost sharing. IOM’s rights-based approach is helpful in this sense. Hence governments’ efforts should focus on protecting the rights of those who are mobile rather than giving in to the obsession of fortressing borders which proven to be very costly and futile so far.

Here we can recall the origins of the European Union idea. Reflecting on the wars and damage they caused in Europe, the belief Jean Monet had in mind was that economic cooperation would reduce friction and gradually result in a unity in the long run. Economic cooperation increases the mobility

of goods and finances and yet we are so scared of such effect which also comes from increasing mobility of people. The most recent figures on trends in global migrant remittances indicate further growth and resilience during the financial crisis (Sirkeci et al. 2012). At micro level, these small amounts of money along, with social remittances, may contribute to something bigger in terms of socio-economic development and security for all.

Conclusion

Migration and irregularity in human mobility are closely linked to the regulations and practices aimed at controlling migration. Surveys and studies argue that controlling migration is almost impossible, and that migration governance tends to shift towards managing migration rather than “controlling” or stopping it. The successful management of migration, particularly of labour migration, requires a conducive legislative environment (both for labour and human mobility). The conflict model aims to explain human mobility with reference to conflicts arising at various levels and with variable intensities. The perception of conflicts may motivate individuals and groups to migrate, and, once migration begins, a culture of migration can develop and ensure the maintenance of migratory flows over a longer period. Conflict and crises are subsumed in these cultures of migration.

It is important to recognise the shift towards transnationalism both in business affairs and individual affairs. Increasingly more firms are considered to be transnational corporations (TNCs), including state owned TNCs (UNCTAD, 2011) that demand a borderless world, especially for highly skilled migrants. Human mobility today is a transnational phenomenon requiring management or cooperation among sending, transit and receiving nations. Such cooperation cannot be restricted to building walls, but must focus on increasing and protecting the environment of human security without discrimination. One country’s illegal immigrant is another country’s citizen who deserves protection.

International migration is part of a larger drive for mobility, linked to internal moves as well as immobility. Typologies commonly used in migration discourse fail to reflect the multiple motivations for human movement. Expressed and/or registered motivations are moderated by political, legal, regulatory and cultural contexts. Thus, asylum seekers and refugees are also part of a “culture of migration” as they move and negotiate the move with non-movers.

Economic crises in destination countries curb immigration a little while growth encourages it, and steady economic growth in Turkey makes the country an attractive destination. However, Turkey’s inexperience with this type of migration is a risk if and when economy stalls in the near future, so the government must develop support systems to help in the event of a crisis. Conflicts and large troubled populations on Turkey’s borders suggest continued inflows from countries such as Iraq, Syria and others.

Turkey’s ability to manage labour migration (regular or irregular alike) is not yet established. The newly formed General Directorate of Migration (2013) is tasked to develop necessary structures and frameworks of operation. Similar to ending child labour, reducing the exploitation of (illegal) migrant workers requires a comprehensive approach involving education and sanction at all levels (e.g. EU, 2009). Knowing the extent of such migration requires more and better data gathered through quality surveys and registers. Despite significant improvements in infrastructure and progressive approach, Turkish authorities need to address problematic areas in the processes of collecting data on human mobility in Turkey. Timely sharing of such data among government departments as well as research community can only help to alleviate existing problems.

Turkey’s economic progress and political stability together with her historic and cultural links with countries in the region as well as migration history with Western Europe can be seen as a combined set of factors facilitating immigration to Turkey. People avoiding conflicts in other countries are seeking safety and security in Turkey. Turks in Europe and their descendants as well as family and

friends are moving to Turkey in large numbers. Yet, Turkey's legal and administrative infrastructure as well as political will is likely to facilitate irregularity as people will continue trying and entering the countries long and porous borders towards Middle East. Yet, Turkey and other new destinations for migrants can serve as an example for managing migration in the 21st century. Without the historical preconceptions and associations which often complicate migration policy making in traditional destinations, Turkey can consider innovative new approaches and better instruments to understand and manage migration. Not before time one might say.

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