

Turkish migration in Europe and desire to migrate to and from Turkey

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Abstract

Turkey's accession to the European Union has turned out to be a very long saga. One of the concerns in Europe is that Turkey's membership would open the way for millions of immigrants from Turkey arriving in Western European member states, as was believed to be the case with Eastern European enlargement in the 2000s. This paper focuses on migration flows and causes of human mobility while drawing upon the Gallup World Poll on migration in Europe with particular reference to the data on desire to migrate permanently from Turkey and to Turkey. The Gallup World Poll is an on-going project surveying residents in more than 150 countries on a variety of topics including international mobility. The full data set includes over 400,000 face-to-face interviews conducted in 2009, 2010 and 2011. Despite exceptions with different sample sizes, in each of the 160 countries 3,000 cases were collected as part of a larger survey. Turkish respondents have lower desire to emigrate compared to the rest of the world while Iranians and Germans are top groups who desire to migrate to Turkey. The data shows that Turkey has been a growing economy and attracting immigration while also producing emigration. Turkey's overall socio-economic and political record suggests that the desire to migrate from Turkey will continue despite recent economic advances. Nevertheless, the Gallup data shows that the level of desire to migrate in Turkey is remarkably lower than many neighbouring countries and Europe.

Keywords: Turkish migration, Europe, Desire to migrate, Turkey, Gallup World Poll, migration projection

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Introduction

According to the Gallup World Poll, nearly 630 million (14%) people desire to move to another country while only about 7.6 per cent of world's adult population are planning to move within a year and only about 3 per cent are already preparing –i.e. applying for visas and booking tickets (Esipova *et al.*, 2011). This last figure is more or less corresponding to the estimated total number of migrants in the World –i.e. around 214 million (3.1%) by 2010 (UN DESA, 2009). About one third (69.8 million) of these migrants are estimated to be in Europe: 1.4 million in Turkey, 6.4 million in Spain, 6.5 million in the UK, 10.8 million in Germany, and 12.3 million in Russian Federation. Nearly half of the world's migrants are based in less developed countries and least developed countries - about 98 million. Nevertheless, a high percentage of immigrants in the total population of Europe is a fact, while trends and directions in the near future are unknown. While a reasonable increase in mobility for Turkish citizens within the EU countries is expected, Far Right claims about '75 million Turks roaming around the EU'¹ are unrealistic. Turkey's role as a country of origin for one of the largest minority populations in Europe, as a transit country, and as a destination country are of concern to academics, practitioners, and policy makers.

Turkey's European Union (EU) membership adventure began five decades ago and seemingly it will take quite a while until we see a shift. Public opinion polls in Turkey are showing a decline in Turks' interest in membership reflecting the Turks' frustration in this lengthy process. According to the European Commission's progress report on Turkey-EU relationships, by 2012 only one of the 32 chapters of negotiation has been concluded satisfactorily (EC, 2012). The report confirms that Turkey is the sixth biggest trade partner for the EU, and the EU -with 75 per cent of FDI's and 50 per cent of Turkish international trade- is the largest trade partner for Turkey. However, nearly a third of the report is about issues of democracy and human rights violations in Turkey. These demands and criticisms of the EU over Turkey's policies and practices regarding human rights is an example for the conflict (incompatible interests perhaps) between Turkey and Europe. It also means relative deprivation of human rights in the country is a cause for conflict in Turkey. According to our conflict model of migration (Sirkeci, 2006 and Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011), these conflicts are drivers for migration.

Turkey's economy remained strong during the last decade which has been reassuring for her European partners. Nevertheless, it is a common concern that Turkey's EU membership could cause a mass migration from Turkey to Europe where already a large (i.e. between 3 to 5 million) Turkish immigrant population exist. The 10 Eastern European countries' accession to the EU in the mid-2000s caused a great concern when significant numbers of Polish and other Eastern Europeans are believed to have migrated to the UK and elsewhere immediately after the accession agreement came into force (Burrell, 2009, DWP, 2008, Drinkwater *et al.*, 2006). Nowadays a similar anxiety exists regarding Bulgarian and Romanian access to the UK and certain EU countries in 2014.²

The Turkish migration regime is better understood from a conflict perspective as described and discussed elsewhere (Sirkeci, 2005a, 2006, 2009a and Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011). The Turkish context of conflict - comprises socio-economic challenges and difficulties including regional differences, a long term ethnic conflict and troubled minority affairs in Turkey, as well as discrimination, xenophobia, and economic difficulties faced in destination countries. These very broadly defined conflicts along mezzo and micro level conflicts have shaped and moderated the outflows and inflows of migrants in Turkey. Along with conflicts which can be identified as facilitating human mobility, the established networks of migration and developed culture of migration must be considered to understand potentials and trends of future migrations to and from Turkey. In this paper, first Turkey's potential as a country of migration and a source country are discussed in relation to past and

¹ See: <http://www.ukip.org/content/latest-news/2413-turkey-not-ready-to-join-eu>.

² For example, see: UK will not extend Romania and Bulgaria migration curbs (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20287061?print=true>); Migration Watch warning on Romanian and Bulgarian immigration (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21039087?print=true>); Britain is facing new eastern Europe immigration surge (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/9637967/Britain-facing-new-eastern-Europe-immigration-surge.html>).

current human mobility trends. Then, the ‘desire to migrate to and from Turkey’ is elaborated using data from the Gallup World Poll.

Turkey: A country of emigration, immigration, and transit

Earlier studies argue that emigration is more likely to be from countries where push factors are strong towards countries where pull factors are strong (Dorigo and Tobler, 1983, Zimmermann, 1996). There is a mature body of literature on the link between migration and wage differentials, development and migration (Piore, 1979, Borjas, 1994, Todaro, Martin, 2012 and 1991). Naturally, people have varying and often multiple motivations for migration. These may be moderated by gender, occupations, educational attainment, and so on. For example, Vujicic *et al.* (2004) identifies gaining experience and upgrading qualifications among top reasons for migration of sub-Saharan African health professionals. Boneva *et al.* (1998), on the other hand, proposed a migrant personality model (within the framework of McClelland's motivational theory (1987). Thus they argue that higher achievement motivation and lower affiliation trigger migration.

Sirkeci (2005, 2006, 2009a) and Cohen and Sirkeci (2011) proposed a model based on understanding a variety of conflicts determining human mobility behaviour as well as indicating the directions characterising the process of migration. Within this model, conflicts of any kind appear as a driver for migration (and non-migration to the same effect). Turkey’s migration history can be better understood through the lenses of conflicts in the country and in its neighbourhood. Urbanisation and industrialisation in Turkey played a role in internal and international migration –which we prefer to consider on a continuum (see Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011). While population growth pressurised rural areas, industrialisation appeared to attract people to cities in Turkey. This has coincided with mass migration from Turkey governed by bilateral labour exchange agreements in the 1960s and 1970s.

The conflicts of 1970s and the military intervention in 1980 resulted in hundreds of thousands fleeing Turkey. In the 1980s, at least 503,627 asylum applications were filed by Turkish citizens in the industrialised countries (UNHCR, 2001; Sirkeci, 2006). The war with the PKK began in the mid-1980s and created 309,764 more asylum seekers in the 1990s (UNHCR, 2001); there were a further 203,976 asylum applicants from Turkey in the 2000s. This ethnic conflict is still believed to be one of the drivers for emigration from Turkey as the number of asylum seekers from Turkey was reported to be 6,509 in 2010 and 6,843 in 2011, while an even higher number is expected for 2012 (UNHCR, 2012). According to UNHCR data, by the end of 2011, there were officially 139,779 refugees originating from Turkey along with some 19,000 asylum applications filed in the first 30 months of the 2010s. This means **a total of 1,033,000 Turkish citizens filed an asylum application** in an industrialised country during the 33 years since the military intervention in 1980. This fact alone is evidence which indicates a link between conflicts and migration outflows. Nevertheless, categories of migration are simply reflecting administrative motives and interests rather than the motives of movers and non-movers. That is to say among the so many millions of Turkish citizens who arrived in Western Europe and elsewhere there were many whose move was motivated not only by various conflicts, but also by their desire for better jobs or education (See Sirkeci, 2006).

*Asylum seekers from Turkey:
In the 1980s: 503,627
In the 1990s: 309,764
In the 2000s: 203,967
In 2010-2011: 13,352*

*139,779 refugees from Turkey
by the end of 2011.*

It is possible to argue then that migration to and from Turkey has evolved throughout the last century along the lines of incompatible interests, tensions, and conflicts. Despite common emphasis on the flows of labour emigration from the country in the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey has also been a country of immigration for quite a while (Avci and Kirisci, 2006). Significant population flows to modern Turkey date back to the 1910s and the period around the War of Independence following the First World War, when millions were displaced and subjected to compulsory population ex-

changes. The nationalist character of policies and the period can be blamed for large population losses, particularly among non-Muslim groups. Towards and around the mid-20th Century, these outflows continued with intervals in a rather reactionary fashion in response to events such as *Wealth Tax in 1942* and the *6-7 September 1955* both are believed to have caused sizeable number of non-Muslims fleeing Turkey.

Similarly, inflows of Turkish and Muslim origin minorities continued to move to Turkey throughout the century. Migrations from Bulgaria have been particularly remarkable in certain periods such as over 400,000 arriving in between 1989 and 1994. Similar large immigration fluxes were also reported from Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and most recently from Syria each following respective conflicts in their countries. Although the statistics are poor and often unreliable, since the turn of the century, possibly linked to economic growth and relative political stability in the 2000s, one can expect and find some evidence of increasing immigration to Turkey from Europe –possibly members of the Turkish diaspora- as well as from Middle Eastern, Asian and African countries.

Both past and recent inflows from Middle Eastern and African countries to Turkey have seemingly been moderated by conflicts in countries of origin. Among others in the region, Turkey seems a relatively safer country with a prospering and promising economic environment. However, one should still be cautious here. Despite the evidence for Turkey's continuous economic development, what determines or largely shapes migration decision is not the objective –or evidence based- facts but the perceptions. Hence, in earlier studies we have formulated it as “perceived environment of human (in)security”, which is not always based on factual information (Sirkeci, 2006, 2009a). For the Syrians fleeing their homes in fear of persecution in 2012 and for the Kurds who fled Iraq in the 1990s, Turkey must have appeared as an “environment of human security” (Sirkeci, 2005a). Otherwise, some commonly known macro indicators do show us that Turkey's so-called economic boom during the 2000s has not been translated into the desired levels of human development. United Nations' annual Human Development Reports show that Turkey's ranking has not improved much as the country sits on 92nd place among 187 countries despite being one of the top 20 biggest economies in the world (UN, 2012).

Apart from the mass influxes and outflows, individual emigration to and from Turkey was maintained throughout the short history of modern Turkey. Migration literature though mostly focused on the last five decades beginning from the early 1960s when the bilateral labour exchange agreements resulted in mass migration to Germany and other western European countries. Categorisation attempts so far, including my own, tend to align with administrative classifications of migration such as highlighting the dominance of asylum migration, or family reunifications. We can perhaps divide it into two periods, firstly the pre-1960 period: individual outmigration, outmigration of non-Muslim minorities and inflows of Turkish and Muslim minorities from former Ottoman territories dominated the migration from and to Turkey (Sirkeci, 2005b).

Secondly, the post-1960 period, which was dominated by mass emigration linked with rapid urbanisation in Turkey. This second period can be further divided into several periods indicating the fact that from the late 1980s onwards, Turkey has become both a transit and immigration country. Nevertheless, Turkey since the early 1980s remained as one of the leading source countries for refugee and asylum migration in the world. This is mostly due to the Kurdish question which is facilitating emigration in response to an environment of human insecurity. As a result a large Kurdish diaspora emerged in Western Europe originating from Turkey and joined by Kurds from Iraq, Iran and Syria (Sirkeci, 2006).

Turkey's international migration history can also be divided into periods as migration destinations have varied over time. This variation is mostly determined by Turkey's agreements with receiving countries and changes to these circumstances. Whilst during the 1960s, Western Europe was a prominent target destination, during the 1970s and 1980s, Gulf Countries and other Arab countries such as Libya received a substantial number of migrant workers from Turkey. At the same time, Australia began to appear as a destination country. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation and Turkic countries of Caucasia and Central Asia were put on the destinations

map for Turkish migrants. The United States and Canada attracted perhaps a steady stream of highly skilled migrants from Turkey over the last century. Although some variation has been reported for recent decades, flows to the US have been historically characterised by professionals and post-graduate students (Akcapar, 2009). According to the 2000 US Census, there were 117,575 Turks in the country (Bittingham and de la Cruz, 2004).

Despite the fact that only very few studies are overtly focused on ethnic conflicts and migration (see my earlier work: Sirkeci, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007), ethnic and minority affairs in Turkey are seemingly a moderating factor for the Turkish international migration regime. Ethnic conflict has almost always coloured the map of migration motivations and it is indirectly evident in, for example, the dominance of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants during the last two to three decades of outflows from Turkey (e.g. Sirkeci, 2006).

Turkish (and Kurdish) diaspora today ranks among the top nationalities among immigrants in the world. This has implications for both determining the destinations for future migration from Turkey but also for the countries of origins of those migrating to Turkey. The total number of Turkish citizens living abroad is estimated to be around 4 million which goes up to 6 million when naturalised Turks and others are included. According to the existing and available data, the largest segments of immigrant population from Turkey are present in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland while the total number of Turkish citizens in 27 EU countries is estimated to be about 2.35 million (Vasileva, 2010). However, one must note that immigration figures are almost always unreliable due to the nature of human mobility, problems and differences in data collection and definitions used.

As immigrants are established in the host countries, it becomes difficult to trace the total volume of immigration-bound minorities. Difficulty in having accurate statistics about these minorities arises from various reasons including; data collection methods used in capturing migration and minority information, classification preferences used in official data collection, difficulty in capturing second and third generations, classification difficulties regarding mixed ethnicities, lack of data on return migration, circular short term mobility, and large number of naturalisations over years. Hence, the number of Turkish citizens in Germany (according to official statistics) seems to decline from over 2,053,000 in 1999 to 1,6 million in 2010 and about one third of those were born in Germany (Vasileva, 2011; Statistische Bundesamt, 2012). The total number of people of Turkish origin (including the Kurds) living in Germany is estimated to be between 2.6 to 4 million once naturalisation and later generations are taken into account (Sirkeci et al., 2012b:36). From 2004 onwards, net migration between Turkey and Germany has been negative (Sirkeci et al. 2012a). A similar declining trend is evident in the Netherlands, France, Austria, and Switzerland –other major destinations for Turkish migrants - but these are all moderated by a number of naturalisations. However, in the UK, the number of immigrants from Turkey seems to have grown between the two censuses in 2001 and 2011.

Table 1 summarises various statistics available on human movements from Turkey to the UK from 1980 to 2011. According to the Annual Population Surveys and Labour Force surveys, the number of residents who were born in Turkey is estimated to be 72,000 (ONS, 2012). This figure was esti-

Table 1: Asylum, Citizenship, Immigration – from Turkey to the UK, 1980 – 2011³

	Asylum application	Citizenship	Grants of settlement	Visas issued	Admitted at border
1980	21	120			
1981	0	175			
1982	38	215			
1983	43	210			

³ Asylum applications are reported usually by nationality or citizenship whereas immigrant population is reported by country of birth unless otherwise stated.

1984	61	340			
1985	27	390			
1986	86	350			
1987	121	485			
1988	337	365			
1989	2,415	445			
1990	1,590	559			
1991	2,110	988			
1992	1,865	541			
1993	1,480	710			
1994	2,045	689			
1995	1,820	706			
1996	1,420	931			
1997	1,445	1,118	4,235		
1998	2,015	2,154	2,360		
1999	2,850	2,913	5,225		
2000	3,990	4,875	5,220		
2001	3,693	4,037	3,310		
2002	3,494	8,040	2,920		
2003	2,992	4,916	4,365		
2004	1,588	4,860	6,060		124,000
2005	951	6,767	5,331	67,652	140,000
2006	426	5,583	3,039	78,698	160,000
2007	208	4,709	2,547	80,016	147,000
2008	193	4,641	3,671	84,020	172,000
2009	187	7,207	3,452	79,739	178,000
2010	155	4,630	5,580	87,818	191,000
2011	170	3,627	3,681	90,316	212,000
TOTAL	39,836	78,296	60,996	568,259	1,324,000

Source: UNHCR, UK Home Office, ONS.

mated to be 61,000 by 2004⁴ (ONS, 2004) and 52,396 born in Turkey along with 75,763 born in Cyprus⁵ in the 2001 UK Census. The 2011 UK Census, though, reports 91,115 Turkish born in England and Wales.⁶ Nevertheless, the official statistics on asylum seekers, settlement visas⁷, and citizenship indicate a much larger population: These three figures suggest **between 140,000 and 180,000 UK residents were born in Turkey**⁸ by the end of 2011 while indicating 212,000 admitted at the UK borders despite only about 90,000 visas were issued.

⁴ Kucukcan (2004:247) cites a figure of 79,000 for 2003 but it is based on Turkish sources and not by the UK statistics/registers.

⁵ About 25 to 30 per cent of those born in Cyprus is believed to be of Turkish origin. As an indication we can take that according to the 2001 UK census, 24 per cent of Cyprus born UK residents were Muslim.

⁶ According to the UK censuses, from 2001 to 2011, the share of London among Turkish-born declined from 75 per cent to 65 per cent implying a rather dispersed population.

⁷ Settlement visas are currently issued after 5 years of permanent residence in the UK. At the end of 6th year of residency, individuals are allowed to apply for British citizenship.

⁸ Considering the size of asylum applications over the three decades and the fact that main conflict, therefore main source for fear of persecution, in Turkey has been the Kurdish question and the war between the PKK and Turkish security forces, one can –and should– point that the Kurds from Turkey constitute at least about 40 per cent of Turkish born population in the UK.

As mentioned earlier the figures are insufficiently accurate to guarantee population size, and are inadequate to help understand the ethnic and religious variety known to exist among the Turkish born minorities in the UK, Germany and elsewhere. Nevertheless, these countries are part of a migration network along which individuals, families, and groups from Turkey and their descendants are likely to move. For example, Germany is both the top source country for immigrants in Turkey and the top destination country for those emigrating from Turkey (Sirkeci, 2009b). In brief, one can guess that the desire to migrate often occurs within a set environment shaped by established networks of mobility.

Migration is more often than not a decision made within households in response to the immediate and wider environment based on the perceptions of individuals, families, and communities (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011). Minor and major conflicts –i.e. tensions, disagreements, obstacles, clashes, wars- are perceived by people as environments of human (in)security. Thus, migration is a reaction, one of the strategic options to overcome the difficulties perceived by moving (i.e. migrants) and non-moving (non-migrants) actors. Therefore it is no surprise that Gallup World Poll find that sub-Saharan Africa, one of the world's most deprived and conflict-prone regions, stands on top of the league of migration desire as 33 per cent of adults would like to move (Esipova *et al.*, 2011).

Desire to migrate: Future migration potential

Analyses in this study are based on Gallup surveys 2009, 2010, and 2011. The data was collated from interviews conducted in 2009, 2010, and 2011 as part of the larger Gallup World Poll.⁹ In each country, Gallup conducts interviews in the official language. As a result, individuals who do not speak the official language in their country of residence may be under-represented. Of the total sample across 15 countries, 3% of individuals contacted were unable to participate because of a language barrier. Results are based on aggregated telephone and face-to-face interviews with 401,490 adults, aged 15 and older, in 146 countries from 2009 to 2011. The 146 countries surveyed represent 93% of the world's adult population. Every year, Gallup conduct 1,000 interviews in Turkey (with adults aged 15 and more). Hence, the analyses specific to Turkey are based on 3,000 interviews total.¹⁰

PNMI (Potential Net Migration Index) is based on data from earlier Gallup surveys (i.e. 2007-2010). Nevertheless, questionnaire is very much the same. Our analyses are drawing upon the responses to a few key questions asked in the Gallup's survey: 1) Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country? 2) (If "would like to move permanently to another country") To which country would you like to move? [Open-ended, one response allowed] (Esipova and Ray, 2010).¹¹

Findings and discussion

Perceived environment of human security, as embodied in for example job opportunities and other social development indicators, is determining the destinations (Sirkeci, 2005a and 2009a). The United States then is the top desired destination, with about 23 per cent of potential migrants worldwide wanting to move there (Esipova *et al.*, 2011). It is unsurprisingly followed by Canada, the UK, France, Spain and Australia. Gallup Poll Data is also used to develop the *Potential Net Mi-*

⁹ Further details of the World Poll methodology can be found in Gallup (2012).

¹⁰ This was a serious barrier for more detailed analysis as some cells included very few cases and revealing such figures would be misleading.

¹¹ In the Gallup World Poll there were additional questions which refer to individuals' level of planning and preparation for migration and available networks in the destination country. However, due to small sample sizes, we were not able to exploit these in our analysis. These questions on migration are: 1) Are you planning to move permanently to another country in the next 12 months, or not? 2) To which country are you planning to move in the next 12 months? (asked only of those who are planning to move to another country in the next 12 months), 3) Have you done any preparation for this move? (For example, applied for residency or visa, purchased the ticket, etc.) (asked only of those who are planning to move in the next 12 or 24 months) 4) Do you have relatives or friends who are living in another country whom you can count on to help you when you need them, or not? (Gallup, 2012).

migration Index (PNMI) which is simply “the estimated number of adults who would like to move permanently out of a country if the opportunity arose, subtracted from the estimated number who would like to move into it, as a proportion of the total adult population” (Esipova and Ray, 2010). The index scores were based on over 600,000 interviews between 2007 and 2009. Higher positive PNMI scores indicate net migration gains –net adult population gain. Thus countries such as Sierra Leone, Haiti, Zimbabwe and Nigeria are at the bottom of the league with potential adult population losses of up to 56% whilst Singapore, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Canada and Switzerland were estimated to face adult population gains between 150% and 219%. Turkey’s score in this exercise was -7, in other words, adult population is likely to decline 7% if all desire to migrate materialises. Countries with a similar score were Egypt, Russia, Pakistan and South Korea (Esipova and Ray, 2010). The mid-table ranking of Turkey with a negative score on PNMI scale implies that it will continue to be a source country despite its increasing popularity as an immigration destination.

Evidence shows that Turkey has become a desirable destination for migration in her region and beyond (e.g. Sirkeci, 2009b, Sirkeci *et al.*, 2012c). Nevertheless, as mentioned above (i.e. PNMI) it is still likely that Turkey will see net adult population loss in the forthcoming years if the desires are put into practice. To understand the significance of emigration desire in Turkey –i.e. 13 per cent- it is helpful to compare it with some relevant countries around the world. For example, the BRIC countries, which are emerging economies like Turkey.

Turkey has been aspiring to become a full member of the European Union, a desire dates back to September 1959 when she applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) (EC, 2012). Therefore, it is not surprising to see 59 per cent of Turkish adults desiring to migrate are likely to be destined for Europe (Table 2). It is then followed by America (possibly mostly USA and Canada) which is again the most popular destination for most migrants around the world.

Table 2. Desire to migrate to and from Turkey, by region, 2009-2011

Desire to emigrate		Desire to immigrate	
Potential Destination	%	Potential Origin	%
Europe	59	Europe	38
Americas	16		
Asia	5	Asia	10
MENA	5	MENA	44
SS Africa	2	SS Africa	8
DK/Refused	13		
Total	100		100

Source: Gallup World Poll

Europe is the dominant source region for those desiring to migrate to Turkey is Europe (Table 2). This is understandable because of the large Turkish immigrant communities presence in several European countries. Overall close relations (economic, political, cultural and historic) between Turkey and Europe can explain why adults from European countries are likely to dominate inflows to Turkey.

Among the adults who want to migrate to Turkey, 20 per cent are from Iran, 12 per cent are from Germany, and 7 per cent from Azerbaijan. Previous studies (Sirkeci, 2009b and Sirkeci *et al.*, 2012c) have shown that the largest group of immigrants in Turkey come from Germany, which has been the main destination for Turkish citizens since the early 1960s. This has resulted in a large network that facilitates migration flows in both directions –to and from Turkey. The large community of Turkish immigrants and their second and third generations in Germany is a reason for Germany being one of the main source countries for adults desiring to migrate to Turkey. Iran and Azerbaijan are the other top source countries for potential migration to Turkey for various reasons.

To begin with both countries are geographically and culturally proximate to Turkey. While Azerbaijanis speak Turkish, a large portion of Iran's population is of Azeri origin. Besides, Turkey as a destination has (probably) already an established place within Iranian culture of migration.

Gallup data shows that 13 per cent of Turkish adults desire to emigrate. Again referring to the very same ties between the two countries, the top desired destination for Turkish adults is understandably Germany (25%) and the USA (12%); the former is historically the top destination for Turks with a large stock of Turkish origin immigrants and the latter is the world's largest immigration country. For 7 per cent of Turkey's adult population, the preferred destination is France among other European destinations (Table 3).

In the World Poll, Turkey is considered as part of South East Europe¹² where 16 per cent of adults want to migrate while in Europe overall 18 per cent of adults are willing to emigrate. In this regard, Turkey's figure stands relatively below the World and European averages. It is important to recognise the fact that Turks, Kurds, and others in Turkey show less interest to move to another country compared to their European neighbours overall and differences are even bigger in individual country cases.

Table 3. Desire to emigrate from selected countries, 2009-2011

Top destinations	%	Immigration countries	%	Troubled countries	%	BRICs	%
Germany	18	USA	10	Iran	15	Brasil	13
UK	30	Canada	10	Iraq	16	Russia	13
Netherlands	17	Australia	7	Syria	27	India	5
France	19			Libya	29	China	6
Greece	21			Egypt	17		
Italy	19						

Source: Gallup World Poll

For example, Liberia (53 per cent) in Africa and Haiti (50 per cent) in Latin America have the highest level of desire to migrate in the world. These countries are not in the same league as Turkey. Turkey's position compared to other countries in more or less similar economic trajectories and within her neighbourhood is not surprising. Two of the four strong emerging economies, namely BRIC countries, have the same level of desire to migrate whilst desire to migrate among Indians and Chinese is half that of Turkish. In Libya and Syria remarkably higher percentages of people are reported to desire moving to another country. However, interestingly in Egypt, Iraq and Iran, the corresponding figures are very close to that of the Turkish sample. Adults in top three immigration countries are understandably less interested in moving abroad. On the European side, all of the four main destination countries for Turkish migrants have much higher levels of desire to migrate. The poll data shows a strikingly higher percentage of adults desiring to leave the UK (30 per cent). This can perhaps be a reaction to the fact the UK's economy is believed to be hardest hit among the strongest economies of Western Europe. Similarly, higher level of desire to migrate among Greeks can be credited to the high level of unrest and economic difficulties Greeks went through during the global financial crisis which began in 2008.

Turkey's continuous economic growth and relative political security and stability over the last decade or so should have played a role in establishing its position as an immigration destination. However this is also a possible reason why desire to emigrate is not much higher among the Turkey's adult population. When nearly one in three Brits is willing to move abroad, only one in six Turks is interested in doing so. This is perhaps something supporting the argument that Turkey's relatively strong economic performance during the most recent global financial crisis convinced most of the Turkish adults to stay home.

¹² South East Europe is composed of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey.

Conclusion

Turkey like other countries in a similar position needs to be prepared for even larger migration inflows likely to occur in the near future. This is not always a burden, there are studies showing the positive impact of immigration on development, innovation and entrepreneurship.

Migration discourses in mainstream media and politics are often overly skewed towards anti-immigration sentiments and therefore pointing to migrants who are to arrive in Europe or elsewhere. However, the reality is that it is not a one way street. More or less, in every country and every economic zone in the World some people move in whilst some others move out. Furthermore, in the long run, the differences between inward and outward migration are likely to fade away. Despite the fact that migration networks and established diaspora play a role in maintaining migration flows between countries, migratory regimes are temporal and tend to shift. For example, in the 1950s, Italians, Greeks and Turks were all ‘guest workers’. Five decades on and now Italy is a country of immigration itself, accommodating about 4.5 million migrants.

The conflicts in the neighbouring countries and the region surrounding Turkey, constitute a major context which is likely to facilitate migration to Turkey. The on-going economic crisis and its repercussions in Europe coinciding with discrimination and xenophobia in destination countries are also reasons for likely future migration flows from those countries where established Turkish immigrant populations are present. For example, Germany already tops the list of nationalities among immigrants in Turkey (Sirkeci et al., 2012c).


This preliminary analysis of the data points avenues for further research. For instance, we do not know whether the low level of desire to migrate from Turkey can be linked to negative experiences of migrants abroad. Another interesting line of investigation is the impact of growing far right movements in many traditional immigration countries (in Europe and elsewhere) and the number of attacks on immigrants on migration tendencies. Might have these played a discouraging role for those who may have otherwise considered to emigrate?

Turkish people indicate a lower level of emigration desire compared to World and European averages as well as its neighbouring countries while similar or lower percentages are reported for other emerging markets. That is to say a declining emigration pressure which is expected from a country rapidly becoming a popular immigration destination. This is where Turkey’s preparations should target in managing migration in the next 50 years. While Turkey is still expected to lose some population (i.e. PNMI score -7), it is likely to receive a significant number of movers from its European counterparts (e.g. Germany) and neighbours (e.g. Iran and Iraq). Further economic and/or political troubles in neighbouring countries may simply add to the toll. Turkey’s significantly low ranking on human development index is a summary indicator of the environment of human insecurity perceived to be present in Turkey which may account for future possible emigration from Turkey.

Further quantitative analysis of the Gallup data and qualitative surveys to supplement are needed for better informed policy making and human mobility management. Analyses focusing particularly on vulnerable groups and ethnic and religious minorities such as Kurds, Arabs, and Alevis are necessary for more accurate estimates of potential migration to and from Turkey. For example, regional distribution of desire to emigration would provide relatively better results indirectly reflecting some ethnic variety. Similarly differences by gender and age groups will also help our understanding. The small cell sizes in the data bars us from further detailed analyses but in forthcoming years accumulating data will make rather sophisticated statistical analyses possible.

Appendix

Figure A1. Asylum seeking, settlement, and citizenship by Turkish born in the UK, 1980-2011



Source: ONS, Home Office, UNHCR.

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